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INTRODUCTION
The first time I remember being sexually harassed at work was at my second
job ever, working at a bookstore. There was a man there who always tried
to work sexual innuendo into every conversation we had. He’d find excuses
to touch my back or arm, and try to give me massages in the breakroom. He
was constantly winking at me, licking his lips. He would bring a gym bag
to work, and sometimes, when we were in the breakroom together, he’d
unpack the bag like he was organizing it. He’d talk to me about his workout
routine, how important it was for him to stay in shape so he could maintain
his sexual prowess. Then he’d bring out a bottle of KY Jelly, and he’d
slowly and deliberately place it on the table. Staring at me.
Sometimes managers would be in the room, pretending not to hear.
Occasionally a manager would shake their head at him and tsk tsk, like he
was a naughty child. He was not a child. He was 32. I, on the other hand,
was a child. I was 17.1
- Ijeoma Oluo

1. See Ijeoma Oluo, Due Process Is Needed for Sexual Harassment
Accusations—But For Whom?, MEDIUM (Nov. 30, 2017), https://medium.com/theestablishment/due-process-is-needed-for-sexual-harassment-accusations-but-forwhom-968e7c81e6d6 [https://perma.cc/28M4-T9DW].
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Typically social norms change slowly. In the late 1990s, when
Ijeoma Oluo was seventeen,2 sexual harassment was seen as a “tsking”
matter: Only 34% of Americans thought it was a serious problem.3
Then came Alyssa Milano’s #MeToo tweet on October 15, 2017,
which was retweeted over a million times across eighty-five
countries.4 Almost immediately, the percentage of Americans who
believe that sexual harassment is a serious problem shot up to
64%.5 By late 2017, roughly 75% of Americans believed that sexual
harassment and assault were “very important” issues for the country.6
That is a norm cascade.
The assumption that sexual harassment reflects nothing more
than individual misbehavior is changing as well. Two-thirds (66%) of
Americans now say that recent allegations of sexual harassment
“mainly reflect widespread problems in society,” with only 28%
attributing them mainly to individual misconduct.7 The view that
sexual harassment results from a climate of permission created or

2. See id.
3. Juana Summers & Jennifer Agiesta, CNN Poll: 7 in 10 Americans Say
Sexual Harassment Is a Very Serious Problem, CNN (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/22/politics/sexual-harassment-poll/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8XKW-TN7H] (presenting information on Americans’ views on
sexual harassment with data collected in May 1998 and December 2017). A PDF of
full poll results is also available. See CNN December 2017, SSRS (Dec. 22, 2017),
http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2017/images/12/21/rel12d.-.sexual.harassment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8W37-A8PH].
4. Andrea Park, #MeToo Reaches 85 Countries with 1.7M Tweets, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-reaches-85-countrieswith-1-7-million-tweets/ [https://perma.cc/H2JY-NTZT]. We note that prior to the
proliferation of #MeToo tweets, in 2007, Tarana Burke founded her nonprofit, Just
Be Inc., for helping victims of sexual violence and coining her movement “Me Too.”
See Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.amp.html
[https://perma.cc/4ZTS-9BYX].
5. Gary Langer, Unwanted Sexual Advances Not Just a Hollywood,
Weinstein Story, Poll Finds, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/unwanted-sexual-advances-hollywood-weinstein-story-poll/story?id=
50521721 [https://perma.cc/9UEY-7N8D].
6. Baxter Oliphant, Women and Men in Both Parties Say Sexual
Harassment Allegations Reflect ‘Widespread Problems in Society’, PEW RESEARCH
(Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/07/americans-viewsof-sexual-harassment-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/4TDS-WG94].
7. Id.
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tolerated by an employer, formerly confined to feminist theorists,
suddenly seems mainstream.8
This Article began in reaction to a panel on sexual harassment
presented to federal judges, in which a defense attorney included a
squib on Brooks v. City of San Mateo from a past continuing legal
education program she conducted.9 During a call to prepare for the
program, which included Professor Joan Williams and other members
of the panel, joshing ensued as the employment attorneys kidded each
other about what they all called the “one free grab” case. This led
Professor Williams to look more closely at the details.
The plaintiff, 911 dispatcher Patricia Brooks, worked out of the
police station in a city just south of San Francisco.10 While Brooks was
on a 911 call, a senior dispatcher, Steven Selvaggio, put his hand on
her stomach and commented on its softness and sexiness.11 Brooks told
Selvaggio to stop touching her and forcefully pushed him away.12
“Perhaps taking this as encouragement,” wrote Judge Alex Kozinski
for the Ninth Circuit, Selvaggio trapped Brooks against her desk while
she was on another call and put his hand “underneath her sweater and
bra to fondle her bare breast.”13 Brooks removed his hand and told him
he had “crossed a line,” to which Selvaggio responded that she needn’t
worry about cheating on her husband because he would “do
everything.”14 Selvaggio then approached Brooks “as if he would
fondle her breasts again.”15 “Fortunately,” noted the Court, “another
dispatcher arrived at this time, and Selvaggio ceased his behavior.”16
Brooks reported Selvaggio, and the subsequent investigation revealed
that “at least” two female coworkers experienced similar treatment.17
Nonetheless, Judge Kozinski found no sexual harassment on the
grounds that the harassment was not severe.18 This conclusion is hard
to understand given that Selvaggio spent 120 days in jail after pleading
8. See generally Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual
Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong
with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
9. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000).
10. See id. at 921.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 922.
18. See id. at 926.
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no contest to criminal sexual assault for the same incident.19 How can
an incident severe enough to land someone in jail be insufficiently
severe to sustain a civil suit for sexual harassment? Is it reasonable to
require women to endure criminal sexual assault as a condition of
employment?
Relatively little has been written about sexual harassment in law
reviews for the past decade.20 Catharine MacKinnon’s foundational
Sexual Harassment of Working Women was published in 1979.21 After
the Supreme Court’s landmark case of Meritor Savings Banks v.
Vinson22 in 1986, the number of law review articles increased steadily
throughout the 1990s.23 The number of articles peaked in 1999, with
177 published that year.24 The volume of law review writing on sexual
harassment began to fall thereafter, declining sharply after 2001, and
it has continued to decline until very recently.25
This Article returns to the topic and asks whether Brooks v. San
Mateo and four other appellate hostile-environment sexual harassment
cases that have each been cited more than 500 times remain good
19. See id. at 921.
20. To gauge the volume of law review literature on sexual harassment over
the years, we ran a search on Westlaw of the term “sexual harassment” and filtered by
secondary sources and then “law reviews and journals,” and then counted the number
of articles per year with sexual harassment as the main topic from 1988 to 2018.
Articles counted were those that either had sexual harassment as their main topic or
discussed the subject in some significant way; articles that only contained the term
“sexual harassment” but that did not discuss the topic were not counted.
21. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (Yale Univ. Press 1979).
22. See Meritor Savings Banks v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
23. Some important articles published during this early period include:
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1169 (1998) (describing early case law); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination
and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989) (arguing
that sexually oriented behavior undercuts women’s ability to be seen as credible
colleagues); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 691 (1997) (finding that sexual harassment is a “technology of sexism” that
serves to police men into heteronormative masculinity and women into
heteronormative femininity); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment,
107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) (arguing that sexual harassment, particularly in blue-collar
jobs, often is not sexual but is designed to drive women out of coveted jobs).
24. See supra note 20.
25. The number of articles declined to 106 in the year 2000; eighty in the
year 2001; and fifty-seven in 2002. The downward trend continued through the 2000s,
with an average of sixty-three articles per year between 2000–2004 and thirty-seven
articles per year between 2005–2009. Even less was written in the 2010s, with an
average of sixteen articles per year between 2010–2017. Starting in 2018, the number
has increased, with fifty-four articles as of December 10, 2018.
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precedent in the light of the norm cascade precipitated and represented
by #MeToo.26 Our analysis is designed to interrupt what we call the
“infinite regression of anachronism,” or the tendency of courts to rely
on cases that reflect what was thought to be reasonable ten or twenty
years ago, forgetting that what was reasonable then might be different
from what a reasonable person or jury would likely think today.27
These anachronistic cases entrench outdated norms, foreclosing an
assessment of what is reasonable now. To interrupt this infinite
regression, this Article pays close attention to the facts of the casesin-chief discussed below to enable the reader, and the courts, to
reassess whether a reasonable person and a reasonable jury would be
likely to find sexual harassment today.
To illustrate this infinite regression, this Article also discusses
other cases that cite the five cases-in-chief, which we call the “subcases.”28 The sub-cases show how the cases-in-chief use the infinite
regression of anachronism to ratchet up the standard for what
constitutes a hostile environment in their circuit. Both the cases-inchief and the sub-cases reflect an era when sexual harassment was not
taken seriously. They are no longer valid as precedent in an era in
which 86% of Americans endorse a “zero-tolerance” policy toward
sexual harassment.29
It goes without saying that changes in public opinion do not
automatically change the validity of legal precedent. Yet sexual
harassment is a special case because “reasonableness” plays a central
26. On Westlaw, the search term used was the West Key Number 78k1185.
On Ravel Law, we searched for the phrase “hostile work environment” within the
same paragraph as [severe OR pervasive]. Then we chose the three most cited cases
in each circuit, from which we chose five that were most inconsistent with post#MeToo norms. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000);
Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2000); Mendoza v. Borden,
Inc., 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999); Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168
F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1999); Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir.
1995).
27. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What
Judges and Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791,
817-19 (2002) [hereinafter Beiner 2002].
28. “Sub-cases” were located using the “citing references” function on
Westlaw, which provides a list of all cases which cite a case-in-chief. The authors
read the cases on these lists and selected as sub-cases those which relied on the casesin-chief to reach a result which they feel is inconsistent with what a reasonable jury
would likely find today.
29. Chris Jackson, American Attitudes on Sexual Harassment, IPSOS (Dec.
15, 2017), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/npr-sexual-harassment-2017-1214 [https://perma.cc/7QPV-JST2].
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role in both procedural and substantive ways. Procedurally, the typical
sexual harassment case presents as a summary judgment motion by
the employer, where the question for the judge is whether a
“reasonable” jury could find for the plaintiff after making all factual
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Reasonableness is also key in the substantive law. Hostile work
environment cases—which constitute the lion’s share of sexual
harassment cases—require courts to assess whether the hostility was
severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile environment from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,
considering “all the circumstances.”30 The norm cascade around
sexual harassment in the wake of #MeToo is relevant both to whether
a reasonable jury might find that sexual harassment occurred and
regarding what constitutes an objectively hostile work environment
from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.
Reasonableness enters into sexual harassment cases in a third
way too. Employers long have used non-disclosure agreements
(NDAs) to prevent employees from revealing sexual harassment they
experienced in the workplace.31 Indeed, NDAs kept many harassment
survivors silent for years before #MeToo emboldened them to speak
out.32 NDAs executed in the employment context are enforceable only
to the extent that they are “reasonable”33 based on a weighing of the
employer’s interest in secrecy, the employee’s interest in disclosure,
and the public interest in disclosure.34 The norm cascade provides
evidence of the strong public interest in the disclosure of sexual
harassment and is thus relevant to whether NDAs that prohibit
disclosure of sexual harassment can be reasonably enforced.
The central role of reasonableness pivots the norm cascade
directly into sexual harassment law. Whereas smoking at work was
widely seen as reasonable and unobjectionable several decades ago, a
30. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
31. See Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of
Workplace Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2017/10/legal-agreements-sexual-assault-ndas/543252/
[https://perma.cc/GQM4-APBP].
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, 306 F. Supp. 3d 857, 880 (S.D. W. Va.
2018) (holding a confidentiality agreement as void because it was unreasonable,
containing no limitation of time or geographic scope); Spirax Sarco, Inc. v. SSI Eng’g,
Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d 408, 427 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (requiring NDAs to be
“reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy”).
34. See, e.g., Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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rule allowing on-the-job smoking today is now unthinkable. Just as
one would not cite outdated smoking rules to support a conclusion
about what’s reasonable at work today, it makes little sense to cite
outdated sexual harassment rulings that reflect very different notions
of reasonable workplace behavior than exist today in the light of
#MeToo.
This Article is designed to help judges fulfill their role in a very
complex cultural environment. Competently written defense briefs
will inevitably characterize the cases-in-chief in ways that sound
innocuous. This Article seeks to ensure that judges who might be
inclined to rely on these oft-cited cases today are fully aware of the
factual contexts in which a prior court held that no reasonable person
or jury could find sexual harassment. Even judges who felt confident
that they knew what was reasonable in the past should not assume they
know what Americans believe is reasonable today. Those judges
should be more inclined to let juries decide what’s reasonable now.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the traditional
framework governing sexual harassment law.35 Part II uses polling
data to document the norm cascade.36 Part III reassesses five of the
most-often cited circuit court sexual harassment cases in the light of
the norm cascade and the norm cascade’s influence on what a jury
would find reasonable today.37 Part IV examines what is reasonable in
the context of enforcing NDAs against plaintiffs.38 We conclude by
pointing out that judges may soon face an avalanche of opportunities
to reflect on the impact of the norm cascade on sexual harassment
law.39 This Article is designed to help them navigate that challenge.
I. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Sexual harassment was first recognized as a cause of action for
illegal workplace discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in Meritor v. Vinson.40 The Court held in Meritor that
“Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult”41 and that
employers cannot require workers to “run a gauntlet of sexual abuse
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See generally Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Id. at 65.
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in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a
living.”42 The Court continued: “[F]or sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the
conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive working
environment.’”43
Reasonableness entered the hostile-work-environment equation
in the 1993 case Harris v. Forklift, where the Supreme Court held that
to state a valid claim, a plaintiff needs to prove “an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive.”44 Harris overturned a lower
court decision that held that, although an employer’s sexual and sexist
statements offended the plaintiff and would offend a reasonable
woman, no hostile environment was proven because the statements
were not “so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [the
plaintiff’s] psychological well-being.”45 Noting that the hostile
environment test was not “mathematically precise,” the Supreme
Court explained that it could be determined “only by looking at all the
circumstances,” which “may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”46
While psychological harm can be taken into account like any other
relevant factor, “no single factor is required.”47 As we will see below,
some courts have inexplicably turned this language into a requirement
that no behavior constitutes sexual harassment unless it is physically
threatening.48
In Oncale v. Sundowner in 1998, the Court again held that the
environment must be one that “a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position”49 would find hostile in light of all circumstances, including
“the social context in which [the] behavior occurs and is experienced
by [the] target.”50 Thus the plaintiff must prove that the harassing
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive that a reasonable person
42.
1982)).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 66-67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
Id. at 20, 23.
Id. at 22, 23.
Id.
See infra Sections III.B, III.C, III.D, III.E.
Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
Id.
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would feel it altered the conditions of employment, considering the
evidence as a whole and with due consideration to social context.51
Reasonableness also is embedded in the relevant procedural
standard, given the typical procedural posture of these cases. In every
one of the five cases-in-chief discussed in this Article, judges took the
case away from a jury, either by affirming a grant of summary
judgment for the employer or by granting judgment as a matter of law
after the trial was completed.52 In both procedural contexts, judges
may exclude the jury only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could not find for the plaintiff after making all factual inferences in
their favor.53 Thus, in each of the five main cases, as in all hostile
environment sexual harassment cases, courts should be deciding
whether a reasonable jury could have found that a reasonable person
would have considered what happened sexual harassment. We refer to
these two standards collectively as the “Harris reasonableness
standard” or simply the “reasonableness standard.”
Removing cases from juries raises fundamental fairness issues
in any context, but these issues are particularly acute in the context of
sexual harassment cases. The judges in the cases-in-chief made
decisions about what they thought a reasonable jury could find at a
moment in time when norms about sexual harassment were very
different, typically in the late 1990s. Even if they were right then, the
recent sharp shift in social norms surrounding sexual harassment
provides strong evidence that reasonable juries would think differently
today.
II. THE NORM CASCADE
Cass Sunstein coined the term “norm cascade” in 1996.54
Sunstein pointed out that norm cascades occur when societies
51. See id. (providing that social context is a relevant consideration); Harris,
510 U.S. at 21 (defining a hostile work environment as “an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive”); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (“For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment
and create an abusive working environment.’”).
52. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary
Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007).
53. Id. Given that the overwhelming proportion of sexual harassment cases
are brought by women against men, we will use the pronouns “she” and “her” to refer
to the person alleging sexual harassment for reasons of grammatical simplicity.
54. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 909 (1996).
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experience sharp shifts in social norms and cited feminism and the
anti-apartheid movements as examples.55 The term “norm cascade”—
popularized by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in their 1998
Article “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”—has
been most commonly used in the academic field of international
relations.56 Finnemore and Sikkink describe norms as having a life
cycle that consists of “norms emergence” followed by a “norm
cascade” and then “internalization.”57 The first stage involves “norms
entrepreneurs,” who attempt to convince a critical mass of actors to
embrace new norms.58 The cascade begins following a tipping point
where a critical mass adopts the new norm, after which the norm
becomes internalized and no longer a matter of broad public debate.59
Evidence that #MeToo has prompted a norm cascade comes
from three different kinds of polls.60 The most compelling kind of data
compares polls taken before #MeToo with those taken afterwards. The
second kind of data simply reports the overwhelming agreement
among the American public that sexual harassment is a serious
problem. The third kind of data compares what people believe is the
impact of the norm cascade rather than providing direct evidence of
what that impact is. Questions in polls of this kind ask people to
compare their understanding of what norms were in the recent past
with what norms are today. Combining these three types of data
provides a vivid picture of the contours of norm cascade. In effect, it
represents five related shifts.

55. See id. at 912.
56. See Martha Finnemore & Katherine Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998).
57. Id. at 895.
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Daniel Drezner, #MeToo and the Trouble with New Norms,
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/
wp/2018/02/14/metoo-and-the-trouble-with-norms/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.
66026cad68f0 [https://perma.cc/4UKJ-DDL8] (using the term “norm cascade” to
debate #MeToo).
60. The Authors have been able to verify that all polls cited are of nationally
representative samples except two: Jackson, supra note 29; Summers &
Agiesta, supra note 3. We were unable to verify that these polls were nationally
representative due to lack of available information. We have tried to ascertain via
phone calls and will continue trying to establish contact in order to verify that all polls
are of nationally representative samples.
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A. New Norm #1: Sexual Harassment is a Serious Problem
Widespread agreement exists today that sexual harassment is
serious. In the late 1990s, only 34% of Americans believed that sexual
harassment was a serious problem,61 but today, around 75% do.62 In
1998, a majority of Americans said that people were too sensitive
about sexual harassment; shortly after the #MeToo tweet, a majority
said that workplaces are not sensitive enough to sexual harassment.63
Americans also seem to believe others are taking sexual harassment
more seriously today.64 Two-thirds (66%) of Americans believe that
reports of sexual harassment were generally ignored five years ago;
only 26% of Americans believe they are ignored now.65 Additionally,
Americans now recognize that men are sexually harassed too.66
The consensus that sexual harassment is a serious problem is
strongest among younger people.67 Americans under thirty years old
are more likely than those fifty or older to view sexual harassment as
a serious problem.68 Another poll found that two-thirds (66%) of
Americans sixty-five or older say that heightened attention to sexual
harassment has made navigating workplace interactions more difficult
for men.69 Only 42% of Americans under age thirty agree.70 Judges—
who are more likely to be over fifty than under thirty—should keep

61. Summers & Agiesta, supra note 3.
62. Oliphant, supra note 6.
63. See Lydia Saad, Concerns About Sexual Harassment Higher Than in
1998, GALLUP (Nov. 3, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/221216/concerns-sexualharassment-higher-1998.aspx [https://perma.cc/NX8F-4KLW].
64. See Jackson, supra note 29.
65. Id.
66. See Jacob Bernstein, Matthew Schneier & Vanessa Friedman, Male
Models Say Mario Testino and Bruce Weber Sexually Exploited Them, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/style/mario-testino-bruceweber-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/T7MH-KSMX]; Aja Romano, Kevin
Spacey Has Been Accused of Sexually Assaulting a Minor. He Deflected by Coming
Out as Gay, VOX (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/10/30/
16569228/kevin-spacey-assault-allegations-anthony-rapp [https://perma.cc/L5LSSCAN].
67. See Oliphant, supra note 6.
68. See id. (noting that 81% of adults ages eighteen to twenty-nine say the
issue of sexual harassment is “very important” issue for the country, compared to 68%
of Americans fifty or older).
69. Nikki Graf, Sexual Harassment at Work in the Era of #MeToo, PEW
RESEARCH (Apr. 4, 2018), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/04/04/sexualharassment-at-work-in-the-era-of-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/T3Z7-C6BF].
70. Id.
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this in mind when assuming that they know what reasonable
Americans believe today.
B. New Norm #2: Broad Agreement Exists About What Behaviors
Constitute Sexual Harassment
The traditional assumption was that one should be wary of
labeling problematic behavior as “harassment” because different
people (particularly people of different genders) interpret the same
behaviors differently. What is harassment to one person might just be
horseplay or flirting to another. This view was well expressed by
Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurrence in Harris v. Forklift,71 which
warned that that law “lets virtually unguided juries decide whether
sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is
egregious enough” to be considered sexual harassment.72 Scalia’s
language likely encouraged federal judges to take summary judgment
cases away from these “largely unguided” juries.
If this worry was well justified when Justice Scalia expressed it
in 1993, it is no longer so today. Widespread agreement exists (among
96% of women and 86% of men) that touching or groping is sexual
harassment.73 There are similar levels of consensus that sexual
harassment includes: being forced to do something sexual (91% of
women; 83% of men); masturbating in front of someone (89% of
women; 76% of men); exposing oneself (89% of women; 76% of
men); sharing intimate photos without permission (85% of women;
71% of men); and sending sexually explicit texts or emails (83% of
women; 69% of men).74 There is even strong agreement that verbal
comments alone can constitute harassment: 86% of women and 70%
of men believe that making sexual comments about someone’s looks
or body is sexual harassment.75
These findings highlight not only that strong consensus exists
about what kinds of behaviors constitute sexual harassment but also
that the consensus cuts across gender lines. Men and women now
largely agree that people are entitled to show up to work and be treated
as colleagues, not as sexual targets or opportunities. Sexual
71. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993).
72. Id.
73. The Behaviors Americans Count as Sexual Harassment, BARNA (Nov.
28, 2017) [hereinafter BARNA], https://www.barna.com/research/behaviorsamericans-count-as-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/U7MJ-8V6W].
74. Id.
75. Id.
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harassment—certainly if it involves groping, touching, or sexual
ridicule—is now viewed as aberrant behavior that most Americans, of
all genders, consider inappropriate.
C. New Norm #3: Employers Should Not Tolerate Sexual
Harassment
The old norm was that employers should not be held responsible
for the sexual antics of their employees and that women should “suck
it up” if they felt they had been harassed and should not go running to
Human Resources for help.76 When Professor Williams entered the
workforce in the 1980s, she was told that sexual harassment was
something that any woman worth her salt could handle on her own and
that if she could not, she did not belong in the workforce. This is the
norm that has perhaps changed most dramatically. Eighty-six percent
of Americans now endorse a “zero-tolerance” policy, not necessarily
meaning that a harasser should be fired but that harassing behavior
should not be excused or tolerated.77
D. New Norm #4: Sexual Harassment Accusers Are Credible
Before #MeToo, women who complained about sexual
harassment were often stereotyped as vengeful, lying sluts.78 Thus in
1992, one senator asked Anita Hill, “Aren’t you just a scorned
woman?” and she was famously called “a little bit nutty and a little bit
slutty” by David Brock.79 This stereotype was used to compromise
Anita Hill’s credibility, career, and dignity after she testified at the
confirmation hearings of now-Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas.80
In a stunning reversal, less than a third (31%) of Americans now
think that false accusations of sexual harassment are a major

76. This “old norm” is based on the authors’ own workplace experiences.
Such experiences were representative of commonly held beliefs.
77. Jackson, supra note 29.
78. See Joan C. Williams & Suzanne Lebsock, Now What?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Apr. 22, 2019), https://hbr.org/cover-story/2018/01/now-what
[https://perma.cc/RWD5-AUWE].
79. Margaret Carlson, Smearing Anita Hill: A Writer Confesses, TIME (July
9,
2001),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,167355,00.html
[https://perma.cc/E2GQ-LQ68]; Williams & Lebsock, supra note 78. David Brock
later recanted.
80. See Carlson, supra note 79.
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problem.81 Sixty-four percent of American workers say the accuser is
more likely than the accused to be believed at their workplaces—69%
of women and 60% of men.82 At the same time, judges worried about
false accusations can take comfort in the fact that 77% of Americans
believe that both the accuser and the accused should get the benefit of
the doubt until proven otherwise in sexual harassment cases.83
III. FIVE OFT-CITED CIRCUIT COURT CASES DO NOT REFLECT
WHAT REASONABLE PEOPLE AND JURIES WOULD LIKELY BELIEVE
TODAY ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The norm cascade has obvious implications for sexual
harassment law. As discussed above, sexual harassment is grounded
in reasonableness, both substantively and procedurally.84 In Harris v.
Forklift, the Court clarified that the “severe or pervasive” requirement
in Meritor must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable
person: “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond
Title VII’s purview.”85
Reasonableness standards are meant to build flexibility and
continuous updating into the law, not to entrench norms from another
time. Yet many courts have failed to update their understandings of
reasonableness and instead rely on cases reflecting standards of
reasonableness from the last century. To provide a corrective, this
Article highlights aspects of widely cited cases that are substantially
out of step with prevailing, widely held norms about sexual
harassment—for instance, the finding that a reasonable person would
not find conduct amounting to criminal sexual assault sufficiently
severe to constitute a hostile work environment. We also pay close
attention to whether courts create heightened standards for sexual
81. Graf, supra note 69.
82. 11/22: More Than One in Three Women Report Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace, MARIST (Nov. 22, 2017), http://maristpoll.marist.edu/1122-morethan-one-in-three-women-report-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace/#sthash.iq
5zojER.dpbs [https://perma.cc/P49N-XES5] [hereinafter Marist Poll].
83. Jackson, supra note 29. Judges who keep the hostile environment cases
from juries, either by upholding a grant of summary judgment for the employer, or by
directing a verdict for the employer, typically are very careful not to make open
judgments about credibility—that would be to admit that the case needs to go to a
jury.
84. See supra notes 41-44.
85. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
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harassment that reflect the outdated norm that run-of-the-mill sexual
harassment is just not that serious. Our findings, presented below, will
help to ensure that judges are equipped to properly apply sexual
harassment law in a changed and rapidly evolving social and cultural
environment.
A. The Ninth Circuit: Brooks v. San Mateo and its Progeny
1. Brooks v. San Mateo
The 2000 case Brooks v. San Mateo has been cited 1,296 times.86
Brooks was an appeal from a summary judgment for the city of San
Mateo, so the relevant standard was whether a reasonable jury, taking
all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, could find that Brooks had
reasonably perceived her work environment to be hostile.87 As
summarized above, Brooks involved a 911 dispatcher whose coworker
cornered her, groped her stomach, put his hand up her dress, and
“fondled” (the court’s word) her bare breast—all against her
protestations and while she was attempting to handle emergency
calls.88
Judge Kozinski conceded that Brooks herself perceived her work
environment to be hostile, but he found that she failed to fulfill the
additional requirement that the environment be seen as hostile to a
reasonable person.89 He did not mention the relevant standard for
granting the employer’s summary judgment motion: that no
reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.90 His opinion in Brooks
reflects three outdated norms: (1) that groping is not necessarily sexual
harassment; (2) that workplace sexual harassment is not serious, even
up to and including sexual assault; and (3) that employers should not
86. Citing References: Brooks v. City of San Mateo, WESTLAW EDGE,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/ (search in search bar for “229 F.3d 917”; then follow the
“citing references” hyperlink) (last visited May 10, 2019). Only thirty of the citing
cases disagreed with, declined to extend, or distinguished its case from Brooks.
Negative Treatment: Brooks v. City of San Mateo, WESTLAW EDGE,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/ (search in search bar for “229 F.3d 917”; then follow the
“negative treatment” hyperlink) (last visited May 10, 2019).
87. See Brooks v. San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000) (“To hold
her employer liable for sexual harassment under Title VII, Brooks must show that she
reasonably feared she would be subject to such misconduct in the future because the
city encouraged or tolerated Selvaggio’s harassment.”).
88. See id. at 921.
89. See id. at 925.
90. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
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be held responsible for the sexual antics of their employees and
women should just “suck it up” and learn to handle the harassment (as
at least two women had done before Brooks complained, as noted in
the Introduction).
Under Oncale, reasonableness is judged from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.91 Given that 96% of
American women and 86% of men consider “touching or groping” to
be sexual harassment, the reasonable person and jury today would be
highly likely to see stomach stroking and breast fondling as sexual
harassment.92
Another quirky aspect of Brooks is the extraordinarily high bar
it sets for demonstrating “severe” harassment.93 Recall that the alleged
harasser, Selvaggio, was convicted of criminal sexual assault for his
conduct and spent 120 days in jail.94 Brooks holds, in effect, that a
reasonable person would not consider criminal sexual assault at work
severe enough conduct to sustain a claim for sexual harassment.95 This
seems a strange proposition.
Even stranger is Judge Kozinski’s discussion in Brooks of
Al-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace,96 which involved a violent rape in which
a coworker detained the plaintiff overnight, “slapped her, tore off her
shirt, beat her, hit her on the head with a radio, choked her with a
phone cord and ultimately forced her to have sex with him.”97 Judge
Kozinski’s discussion of this case suggests that sexually unwelcome
conduct in the workplace that falls short of violent rape is not “severe”
enough to “create a work environment that a reasonable person would
consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive.”98
In fact, Brooks goes even further, suggesting that even rape on
the job might not support a hostile environment claim: “If the incident
here were as severe as that in Al-Dabbagh, we would have to grapple
with the difficult question of whether a single incident can so
permeate the workplace as to support a hostile work environment
claim.”99 Few judges have been so bold as to claim that even violent
91. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
92. BARNA, supra note 73.
93. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 930.
94. See id. at 922.
95. See id. at 930.
96. See id. at 925.
97. Al-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace, Inc., 873 F.Supp. 1105, 1108 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
98. Harassment, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/
harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/AJG7-SPCR] (last visited May 10, 2019).
99. Brooks, 229 F.3d at 926 (emphasis added).
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rape could not support a sexual harassment case, but a considerable
number of judges belittle what happened to plaintiffs in sexual
harassment cases by pointing out that it was not sexual assault or
rape.100
The Brooks court’s suggestion that even the most severe sexual
violence must “permeate” the workplace in order to constitute
harassment is a flagrant misreading of Supreme Court precedent,
which makes sexual harassment actionable if it is “sufficiently severe
or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an
abusive working environment.’”101 The “permeate” language comes
from Harris v. Forklift, the landmark case that involved allegations
that harassment was pervasive not severe.102 It makes sense to require
pervasive sexual harassment “permeate” a workplace, but it is unclear
what it might mean for a single instance of severe sexual harassment
to do so. The Supreme Court has held that sometimes harassment is so
serious that it need not be pervasive and therefore need not “permeate”
the environment.103
Recall that even after Brooks pushed Selvaggio away, he came
at her again and fondled her breast and then attempted to approach her
a third time.104 “Fortunately, another dispatcher arrived,” notes Judge
Kozinski.105 What if the other dispatcher had not arrived? A reasonable
jury might find that Brooks, after having been groped and
propositioned, found the situation hostile, indeed frightening, as
Selvaggio repeatedly came at her when she was in a vulnerable
situation. Brooks could not simply hang up on 911 calls and run.
Courts sometimes do not recognize the anxiety that may pervade the
workplace for victims who do not know how far a harasser will go
when he or she follows them into the bathroom, grabs their breasts or
100. See, e.g., Morris v. City of Colorado Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 667 (10th
Cir. 2012) (using a line of cases where plaintiffs were raped or sexually assaulted to
distinguish the conduct in the present case and hold it did not constitute a hostile work
environment); LeGrand v. Area Resources for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098,
1102 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that where plaintiff’s supervisor made unwelcome
sexual advances, kissing plaintiff’s mouth, gripping her thigh, and grabbing her
buttocks and reaching for her genitals, the behavior did not rise to the level of
actionable sexual harassment as “[n]one of the incidents was physically violent or
overtly threatening”).
101. Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1996) (emphasis
added) (quoting Hensen v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
102. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
103. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
104. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 921.
105. Id.
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buttocks, or exposes him or herself and tells the victim that he or she
has no self control.106 A reasonable jury today might well find that
Selvaggio’s behavior made the 911 dispatch office a hostile
environment for Brooks.
Brooks offered a muddied legal analysis in its consideration of
whether Brooks’s employer could be held liable for Selvaggio’s
conduct. Given that Selvaggio was not Brooks’s supervisor, a
negligence standard applied: The city would be liable for Selvaggio’s
conduct only if it knew or should have known of Selvaggio’s
conduct.107 Judge Kozinski mentioned this in a footnote, but he never
mentioned or applied this standard in the text.108 If the negligence
standard had been applied, the facts of Brooks suggest that a
reasonable jury might have concluded that the city should have known
of Selvaggio’s behavior for a simple reason: It had happened at least
twice before.109 Judge Kozinski asserted that Selvaggio’s conduct
toward Brooks was an isolated incident,110 but his own recitation of the
facts shows that that was flatly untrue: Judge Kozinski admitted that
Selvaggio had made similar advances to at least two other female
coworkers.111 The court also noted that Brooks “cannot rely on
Selvaggio’s misconduct with other female employees because she did
not know about it at the time of Selvaggio’s attack.”112 The fact that
Brooks did not know about the prior assaults does not establish that the
employer should not have known about them. A reasonable jury could
have found that Selvaggio’s behavior altered the conditions of
Brooks’s employment by making it necessary to fend off sexual
advances while fielding emergency calls and then to keep quiet about
it. Making reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, a jury could
have found that the employer had created a climate of permission in
which Selvaggio felt free to assault his colleagues and where women
were silenced because they believed that they would suffer retaliation
if they complained—a prediction that proved true in Brooks’s case, as
discussed below.113 While Judge Kozinski’s opinion only considers
106. See Anderson v. CRST Int’l., Inc., No. CV 14-368 DSF (MANx), 2015
WL 1487074, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 685 F. App’x
524 (9th Cir. 2017).
107. See Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991)).
108. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 927 n.10.
109. See id. at 922.
110. See id. at 927.
111. See id. at 922.
112. Id. at 924.
113. See id. at 930.
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this evidence in the context of the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the same
evidence is relevant to the issue of whether the employer should have
known about Selvaggio’s on-the-job assaults.
Turning to Brooks’s retaliation claim, Brooks needed to prove
that her employer took an adverse employment action against her in
response to her sexual harassment complaint.114 When Brooks returned
to her post after reporting the incident, she was denied her prior shift
and given a less desirable one; she was denied her desired vacation
schedule; her male coworkers ostracized her; the city was slow to
process her workers’ compensation claim; and ultimately, she
received a “needs improvement” performance evaluation, a
downgrade from her prior “satisfactory” rating.115 The city introduced
no evidence to contradict any of this—or at least no evidence the Ninth
Circuit considered compelling enough to mention.116 These facts lend
understanding to why at least two other women who were assaulted
by Selvaggio before Brooks said nothing.117 Despite Brooks’s
extensive evidence of retaliation, instead of sending the claim to a jury
to decide whether the city retaliated against Brooks, Judge Kozinski
decided the issue himself.118 In doing so, he discounted the negative
performance evaluation, which is considered an adverse employment
action under clear Ninth Circuit precedent.119 He likewise discounted
the vacation denial and the unfavorable shift on the grounds that they
were “subject to modification” because Brooks “abandoned her job”
while appeals were pending.120 This put Brooks in a position where, to
preserve her legal rights, she would have had to continue to work in
an environment so upsetting that it had already driven her to take a
disability leave.121 This approach is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s assurance in Harris v. Forklift that “Title VII comes into play
before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.”122

114. See id. at 928 (citing Payne v. Nw. Corp., 113 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir.
1997)).
115. Id. at 928-29.
116. See generally id.
117. See id. at 922.
118. See id. at 930.
119. See Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987).
120. Brooks, 229 F.3d at 929-30.
121. See id. at 922. We infer that Brooks’s leave was a disability leave from
the Court’s statement that “Brooks had trouble recovering from the incident. She took
a leave of absence immediately afterward and began seeing a psychologist. She
returned to work six months later.” Id.
122. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
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Judge Kozinski achieved this result by disaggregating the
evidence of retaliation and discounting each piece of evidence one by
one.123 He discounted the ostracism on the grounds that “an employer
cannot force employees to socialize with one another.”124 As noted, he
discounted the unfavorable shift, the denial of Brooks’s desired
vacation time, and the negative evaluation on the grounds that the
decisions were not final.125 This approach is what another
commentator has called the “divide-and-conquer strategy.”126 It is a
common defense strategy often used in criminal cases in which one
“isolate[s] each piece [of evidence] . . . and then attempts to trivialize
it by taking it out of context.”127 The divide-and-conquer strategy is
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent that has repeatedly
instructed lower courts to consider whether a hostile environment
existed using a totality-of-the-circumstances test that considers the
evidence as a whole in its social context.128 Considering each piece of
evidence in isolation is the opposite of considering the totality of the
circumstances, which focuses on the cumulative effect.
As is commonplace in the cases-in-chief discussed in this
Article, the divide-and-conquer strategy is used to support the decision
to prevent the case from going to a jury.129 As is again commonplace,
Brooks does so by ignoring the totality-of-the-circumstances test as
articulated by the Supreme Court and instead tuning out virtually

123. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 929.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 929-30.
126. Beiner 2002, supra note 27, at 814; Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of
Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 104
(1999) [hereinafter Beiner 1999]; see also M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile
Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311,
314-15 (1999); Eric Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don’t Get It: Hostile Work
Environment Litigation in the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 280 (1999);
Schneider, supra note 52, at 744 (“[A] slice and dice approach to summary
judgment . . . [that] does not look at the evidence in a holistic way.”).
127. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1262 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998);
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
129. See Beiner 2002, supra note 27, at 793; Beiner 1999, supra note 126, at
71; Medina, supra note 126, at 316; Ann Juliano and Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep
of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 582 (2001); Schneider, supra
note 52, at 706-07; see also Megan E. Wooster, Sexual Harassment Law—The Jury
Is Wrong as a Matter of Law, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 215, 216 (2010).
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everything except the “severe or pervasive” language, holding that
what happened to Brooks was not severe as a matter of law.130
What is the significance of the fact that this extraordinarily
influential opinion was written by Judge Kozinski? In 2008, Judge
Kozinski was admonished for posting on a publicly accessible website
sexually explicit and degrading images of women, including one
where naked women were painted to look like cows.131 He was
admonished for embarrassing the judiciary.132
Kozinski was unrepentant, just as he was more recently when
allegations emerged that he had sexually harassed interns and clerks
since the 1980s.133 Ultimately, at least fifteen women publicly accused
Judge Kozinski of groping their breasts and legs, showing them
pornography in chambers asking if they found it sexually arousing,
giving them prolonged kisses on the cheek, and soliciting sex.134 “If
130. See James Concannon, Actionable Acts: “Severe” Conduct in Hostile
Work Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 20 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y
1, 8 (2012); V. Blair Druhan, Severe or Pervasive: An Analysis of Who, What, and
Where Matters When Determining Sexual Harassment, 66 VAND. L. REV 355, 356
(2013); Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile
Environmental Sexual Harassment to Be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates
Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 85 (2003);
Schnapper, supra note 126, at 326.
131. See Maura Dolan, 9th Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski Is Accused by Former
Clerks of Making Sexual Comments, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-kozinski-sexual-misconduct20171208-story.html [https://perma.cc/9APW-WA9L].
132. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279, 284 (3rd Cir.
2009); see also Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski
Accused of Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/prominent-appeals-courtjudge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1763e2b8-d91311e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html?utm_term=.2677321b1d21
[https://perma.cc/PFS5-MURQ].
133. See Scott Glover, 9th Circuit’s Chief Judge Posted Sexually Explicit
Matter
on
His
Website,
L.A.
TIMES
(June
11,
2008),
https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-kozinski12-2008jun12-story.html
[https://perma.cc/U5PN-HU6E]; Leah Litman, Emily Murphy & Katherine H. Ku, A
Comeback
but
No
Reckoning,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
2,
2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/opinion/sunday/alex-kozinski-harassmentallegations-comeback.html [https://perma.cc/K7G8-9F6V].
134. Matt Zapotosky, Nine More Women Say Judge Subjected Them to
Inappropriate Behavior, Including Four Who Say He Touched or Kissed Them,
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/nine-more-women-say-judge-subjected-them-to-inappropriate-behaviorincluding-four-who-say-he-touched-or-kissed-them/2017/12/15/8729b736-e10511e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html?utm_term=.42442b3f3334
[https://perma.cc/3LR5-B9C8].
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this is all they are able to dredge up after thirty-five years, I am not too
worried,” commented the judge after the initial allegations first
became public.135 Chief Justice Roberts disagreed.136 He appointed the
Judicial Council of the Second Circuit to lead an investigation,
whereupon Judge Kozinski resigned.137
Thus, the judge who wrote one of the most cited sexual
harassment opinions in the country was deeply out of sync with what
his colleagues felt was reasonable behavior at work. Brooks v. San
Mateo is equally out of sync with what a reasonable jury would find
today, when groping is nigh-universally seen as sexual harassment,
and 86% of Americans believe in zero tolerance for sexual
harassment.138
2. Subsequent Cases Have Used Brooks as the Standard for
Sexual Harassment in the Ninth Circuit and Elsewhere
Notwithstanding the poor analyses and inaccurate application of
Supreme Court precedent, Brooks continues to be cited by courts. The
current use of Brooks keeps sexual harassment cases away from juries
and dismisses plaintiffs’ claims of sexual harassment in cases
involving groping and sexual assaults. One such case involved the
plaintiff’s alleged post-traumatic stress disorder as the result of sexual
assault.139
In the 2008 case of Dolan v. United States, the plaintiff was a
student firefighter at the Department of Land Services.140 She was
harassed and assaulted by her mentor.141 While she was on a business
trip, her mentor asked the plaintiff if she had a place to stay and offered
to let her stay at his place; the plaintiff trusted him, viewed him as a
mentor, and did not think he was sexually interested in her.142 When
she arrived, he had been drinking, but the plaintiff had seen him drink

135. Dolan, supra note 131.
136. Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After
Sexual Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us/alex-kozinski-retires.html
[https://perma.cc/T2XC-UR8U].
137. See id.
138. Jackson, supra note 29.
139. See Dolan v. U.S., No. 05-3062-CL, 2008 WL 362556, at *16 (D. Or.
Feb. 8, 2008).
140. Id. at *3.
141. See id. at *5-6.
142. See id. at *5.
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in past without incident and was not concerned.143 However, she
became uncomfortable when he started to slur his speech and was
relieved when he went to bed.144 Ten to fifteen minutes later, he
returned wearing only boxer shorts, straddled her while she was sitting
in a chair, rubbed his genitals against her, and tried to kiss her.145 He
held her in the chair for about ten minutes before she pushed him off.146
She thought he was trying to rape her, ran to the bathroom and locked
herself inside; he banged on the door and shouted at her to open it.147
Eventually, she fled the scene.148 The court cited Brooks and said this
case was similar: “Although the conduct by [the mentor] [was]
certainly egregious and totally unacceptable, it was an isolated
incident and it was never repeated.”149 The court cited Brooks to
support its conclusion that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to
show that a reasonable person would find the environment hostile and
granted summary judgment for the employer.150
In the 2011 case of Sanders v. Mohtheshum, the plaintiff worked
at a Pizza Hut.151 She was harassed by her manager, who groped her
buttocks with two hands in front of other employees.152 He was
charged with a misdemeanor after the plaintiff reported the incident to
local police who came and removed the manager from the store.153 The
court cited Brooks for the proposition that a reasonable woman in the
plaintiff’s position would not have believed the terms and conditions
of employment had been altered by the incident and granted summary
judgment for the employer.154
In the 2014 case of Ludovico v. Kaiser Permanente, the plaintiff
was a nurse whose coworker grabbed her by her shoulder, pulled her
in so that she was not free to leave, and said he would “take his big
wet tongue and shove it into [her] mouth a few times and he was sure

143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at *6.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at *20.
150. See id.
151. See Sanders v. Mohtheshum, No. 10-CV-02897-KLM-DW, 2011 WL
6329866, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2011).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at *5.
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[she] would like that.”155 The court cited Brooks to hold that the
harassment was not pervasive because it was only a single incident
and was not severe enough to alter conditions of employment.156 The
court concluded that the plaintiff had not proved a reasonable person
would find the environment hostile.157 The court granted the
employer’s motion for summary judgment and cited Brooks to defeat
the plaintiff’s retaliation claim.158
Nelson v. Zinke is a 2018 case in which the plaintiff was a
toxicologist at the Department of the Interior.159 During a scuba diving
mission, the plaintiff and a fellow scientist slept in a small one-room
cabin with two bunk beds.160 On the night of the incident, they had
dinner and drank wine before the plaintiff took a sleeping pill and went
to bed.161 The plaintiff recalled that her coworker told her he snored,
and she teased him by saying she had earplugs and had taken a
sleeping pill.162 During the night, the plaintiff became aware that
someone was in her bed but was still not awake enough to be aware of
what was happening.163 The plaintiff could feel that the person had
lifted her top, was fondling her breasts, and pulled her long underwear
bottoms down.164 She was still groggy, wondered where she was, and
thought that her husband was with her.165 When she became more
aware and knew something was not right, she stood up from her bunk,
and her coworker quickly moved back to his own.166 The next day
during a hike, her coworker told her he only realized she was asleep
once she got up from the bunk.167 He made comments including
describing sliding his hand up her leg to “hit her where it counts” and
his attempt to remove her long underwear to “go down on her,”
claiming he thought she was receptive.168 The plaintiff alleged she
155. See Ludovico v. Kaiser Permanente, 57 F.Supp.3d 1176, 1180 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
156. See id. at 1196.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Nelson v. Zinke, No. CV 16-135-M-DWM, 2018 WL 1083032, at *1
(D. Mont. Feb. 27, 2018).
160. See id. at *2.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Id.
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suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, and after this incident,
work became a daily trigger.169
The court cited Brooks for the proposition that “no reasonable
woman in [the plaintiff’s] position would believe” that this isolated
incident permanently altered the terms or conditions of her
employment.170 The court granted summary judgment for the
employer for both this claim and the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, again
citing Brooks.171
3. Ninth Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today
The prior Subsection described just a few of the over 1,200 cases
citing Brooks. Many repeat its conclusion that women who were
groped and assaulted were not sexually harassed. Instead of further
entrenching the infinite regression of anachronism, courts in the Ninth
Circuit should turn to two other oft-cited cases, Ellison v. Brady172 and
Fuller v. Oakland, to support allowing juries to decide what’s
reasonable now.173
a. Ellison v. Brady
Ellison also took place in San Mateo.174 The case involved an
Internal Revenue Service agent, Sterling Gray, who became obsessed
with the plaintiff.175 First he asked her to lunch, and she accepted.176
Then he asked her for a drink after work, and she declined, suggesting
lunch instead, although then she tried to stay away from the office
during lunchtime to avoid his invitation.177 When he finally caught up
to her, she declined him outright when he showed up in a three-piece
suit and asked her out again.178 Gray then wrote the plaintiff a bizarre
note telling her he cried over her the night before and professing his
love.179 The plaintiff became “shocked and frightened” and left their
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id. at *6.
Id.
See id. at *15.
See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1528 (9th Cir. 1995).
See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 873.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 874.
See id.

166

Michigan State Law Review

2019

common workspace, but Gray followed her and demanded they talk.180
The plaintiff left the building and showed the note to her supervisor
who remarked, “this is sexual harassment.”181 The plaintiff asked her
supervisor to let her handle it, which she did by asking a male
coworker to talk to Gray and tell him that the plaintiff was not
interested and that he should leave her alone.182 The plaintiff then
relocated for four weeks of training in a different city, only to receive
a three-page, single-spaced letter from Gray professing his love in
unhinged terms.183
Importantly, the court considered the experience from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation in real
time:
We cannot say as a matter of law that Ellison’s reaction was idiosyncratic
or hyper-sensitive. . . . [Gray] told her that he had been “watching” her and
“experiencing” her; he made repeated references to sex; he said he would
write again. Ellison had no way of knowing what Gray would do next. A
reasonable woman could consider Gray’s conduct, as alleged by Ellison,
sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter a condition of employment and
create an abusive working environment.”184

The court noted: “Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual
harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser’s conduct
is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault.”185 The court went on to
hold that “Title VII’s protection of employees from sex discrimination
comes into play long before the point where victims” experience
psychological harm,186 a holding subsequently adopted by the
Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift.187
b. Fuller v. Oakland
Fuller v. Oakland, which has been cited 683 times, is another
case that is in sync with contemporary understandings of sexual
harassment.188 The plaintiff, Patricia Fuller, was a former police officer
who had a romantic relationship with a fellow officer, Antonio

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 878.
See Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
See e.g., Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Romero.189 After Fuller broke up with Romero, he repeatedly phoned
Fuller and hung up.190 Romero retrieved her changed and unlisted
phone number from personnel records and continued this behavior.191
After Romero called her at work and threatened to kill himself, Fuller
again changed her home number.192 Romero confronted Fuller in the
police parking lot, blocked her exit, and made it clear that he would
not let her leave until she gave him her unlisted number once again.193
Fuller again changed her phone number.194 Yet again, Romero
retrieved it from her personnel files.195
Close to a year after her breakup with Romero, Fuller was
driving with her new boyfriend when Romero came speeding at them
in an unmarked police car.196 Romero forced Fuller to swerve to avoid
head-on collision.197 Romero continued his harassment, conducting an
investigation of arrest rates that Fuller said focused solely on herself
and her allies.198 Romero also allegedly delayed action on Fuller’s
requests at work, gave her poor quality work assignments, and asked
her for an alibi when his car was stolen.199 Fuller reported “feeling
ostracized and afraid for her safety, because visible isolation on the
beat endangers an officer’s safety.”200 She developed a severe stress
disorder, went on disability leave, and ultimately resigned.201
The Ninth Circuit overturned the trial court’s holding that the
alleged conduct was insufficiently severe and pervasive and held that
a hostile environment existed.202 The court enumerated the long list of
Romero’s actions, focusing on the time he called her and threatened
to kill himself and when he ran her and her new boyfriend off the
road.203 These two “incidents, while only single incidents, [were]
sufficiently extreme such that Fuller would no longer know what to
expect next from Romero, and reasonably [would] be concerned that
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id. at 1525.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1525-26.
See id. at 1526.
See id.
See id. at 1526.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1527.
See id. at 1527-28.

168

Michigan State Law Review

2019

he might do anything at any time.”204 The court then focused on
Romero’s persistence in obtaining her unlisted phone number, which
“would reasonably lead Fuller to believe that, no matter how much she
tried, she couldn’t escape Romero. Taken together, the fear that
Romero might do anything and the fact that she couldn’t escape would
lead a reasonable woman to feel her working environment had been
altered.”205 Like Ellison, Fuller considered what a reasonable person
in the plaintiff’s position would consider frightening and
inappropriate.206
Ellison v. Brady and Fuller v. Oakland are more consistent than
Brooks v. San Mateo,207 both with Supreme Court precedent
mandating courts consider the totality of the circumstances and with
what reasonable people and juries would likely believe constitutes
sexual harassment today.208
B. The Eleventh Circuit: Mendoza v. Borden and Its Progeny
1. Mendoza v. Borden
In the 1999 case of Mendoza v. Borden, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld a trial court’s directed verdict, again taking the case away from
a jury.209 Mendoza, though cited in 1,180 other cases, was
controversial when decided—there was an en banc rehearing, and the
eleven judges who decided it wrote five different opinions.210
Mendoza was an accounting clerk who alleged sexual
harassment by Daniel Page, the plant controller and highest-ranking
executive at her work site.211 Mendoza testified that Page followed her
around not only when she was working but also during lunch when
she went outside to eat at a picnic table.212 Mendoza testified that
“[Page] would look me up and down, very, in an obvious fashion.”213
Three times he “looked at [her] up and down, and stopped in [her]

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
F.3d 1522.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1528.
Id.
See id.
See generally Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000).
See generally Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Fuller, 47
See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999).
See id.; see also supra note 26.
See Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1242.
See id.
Id. at 1242-43.
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groin area and made a . . . sniffing motion.”214 One day while Mendoza
was at a fax machine, Page came up and “rubbed his right hip up
against [Mendoza’s] left hip” while grabbing her shoulders; “he had a
smile on his face . . . like he was enjoying himself.”215 This is not a
form of physical contact that happens inadvertently. When Mendoza
went into Page’s office, angry, and said, “I came in here to work,
period,” he replied, “[Y]eah, I’m getting all fired up, too.”216
Mendoza reflects three outdated norms: (1) sexual harassment is
not actionable unless it consists of “uninhibited sexual threats”217 or
the like; (2) it is difficult to figure out what constitutes harassment
because men and women perceive sexual behaviors very differently;218
and (3) “mere” comments, looks, and physical contact are not severe
enough to be considered sexual harassment.219
The Mendoza majority correctly stated that the Oncale test
requires that “the objective severity of the harassment should be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’”220 However, instead of
examining what a reasonable person in Mendoza’s position would
think, the court veered into a long string of earlier cases in which
courts found no sexual harassment in the context of egregious
behavior such as groping of breasts and buttocks, simulated
masturbation, and comments such as calling one plaintiff a “sick
bitch,” telling another “you have the sleekest ass” and inquiring about
the color of a coworker’s nipples.221 This infinite regression of
214. Id. at 1243.
215. Id. at 1243, 1272.
216. Id. at 1243.
217. Id. at 1247 (quoting Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258,
263 (5th Cir. 1999)).
218. See id. at 1256.
219. Id. at 1257.
220. Id. at 1246 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., 118 S.
Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993))).
221. See Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1998)
(describing “four isolated incidents in which a co-worker briefly touched her arm,
fingers, and buttocks” and coworkers who made the plaintiff the butt of sexual jokes
and repeatedly stared at her breasts); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759,
768 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing a situation where a plaintiff’s supervisor touched
plaintiff’s breasts (but only once, we’re reassured) and was told she had the “sleekest
ass”); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1996)
(describing how a male plaintiff’s supervisor stared at his crotch with a magnifying
class, stared at him in the bathroom, and touched his clothing); Shepherd v.
Comptroller of Public Accounts of State of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1999)
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anachronism ended with the court citing a 1999 Fifth Circuit case that
mischaracterized Supreme Court precedent: “All of the sexual hostile
environment cases decided by the Supreme Court have involved
patterns or allegations of extensive, long-lasting, unredressed, and
uninhibited sexual threats or conduct that permeated the plaintiffs’
work environment.”222 This is very different from the Harris
reasonableness standard. The court seemed to be saying that no
reasonable person or jury could find a hostile atmosphere in a wide
variety of contexts, which most Americans consider sexual
harassment today.223 At a deeper level, the view that only an extensive
pattern of uninhibited threats can sustain a cause of action for sexual
harassment clearly signals the belief that sexual harassment is not
serious unless it is downright frightening.
The five different opinions in Mendoza give dramatically
different interpretations of the evidence.224 Judge Tjoflat’s dissenting
opinion described Page’s behavior as “stalking and leering” that
continued for at least four months until Mendoza quit her job.225 “Page
stared at Mendoza’s groin on at least three occasions and made a loud,
sniffing sound. For unexplained reasons, Mendoza failed to become
enraptured. In fact, she became rather terrified.”226 Mendoza
complained to one coworker that Page harassed her at least twelve
different times.227 “She had been stalked, leered at, touched on her hips
and shoulders, and her groin area had been made the object of a
sniffing ritual so bizarre that only Page could understand its true
import.”228 Judge Tjoflat concluded that “Mendoza’s whole
employment experience at Borden’s may have been pervaded by overt
and highly offensive acts of sexual aggression.”229

(describing incidents where the plaintiff’s coworker told her “your elbows are the
same color as your nipples,” touched her arm, looked down her dress, and usefully
informed her that she had big thighs).
222. Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.,
164 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1999)).
223. See BARNA, supra note 73 (finding that virtually all Americans believe
that groping is sexual harassment, and 86% of women and 70% of men believe that
making sexual comments about someone’s body is sexual harassment).
224. See Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1253, 1255, 1257, 1262, 1270.
225. Id. at 1259 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
226. Id. at 1259-60.
227. See id. at 1260.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1263.
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The majority took a very different view of the evidence.230 The
statement about being fired up did not, as a matter of law, “objectively
indicate . . . a sexual or other gender-related connotation.”231 The
“‘following and staring’ may betray a romantic or sexual attraction,”
the majority noted, but it was also “a natural and unavoidable
occurrence when people work together in close quarters or when a
supervisor keeps an eye on employees.”232 Which was it in this
context? Didn’t that determination involve a finding of fact? This
court did not think so.233 The incident at the fax machine was dismissed
as “one slight touching,” ignoring the fact that to grasp both someone’s
shoulders while at the same time touching his or her hip with one’s
own hip could reasonably be interpreted as miming of sex rather than
a run-of-the-mill office ricochet.234
And that is the point. Assuming (as we do) that these five judges
were reasonable people, this was a case in which reasonable people
not only could but actually did disagree.235 That makes it an
inappropriate case for a directed verdict. In a directed verdict situation,
the court must assume that all of the evidence of the nonmoving party
is true and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.236 The
case “may be taken from the jury only if no rational jury could find
against the [plaintiff].”237 To quote Judge Barkett, “assuming there are
reasonable people who, while crediting Mendoza’s version of the fact,
would not think that staring at a woman’s groin area while making
sexually suggestive sniffing noises is degrading, humiliating, and/or
intimidating, it seems beyond peradventure that many reasonable
people would indeed find it to be so.”238
Why, then, did the majority take the case away from the jury?
“In its zeal to discourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits,” wrote Judge
Tjoflat, “the court today hands down an opinion that will certainly be
used by other courts as a model of how not to reason in hostile
environment sexual harassment cases.”239 Judge Tjoflat was
presumably disappointed by Mendoza’s continued influence.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See id. at 1248.
Id. at 1248 (majority opinion).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1249.
See id. at 1253, 1255, 1257, 1262, 1270.
See id. at 1269 (Barkett, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1270 (citing Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949)).
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1257 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
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One judge who sided with the majority attributed his decision to
“the reluctance courts should have about permitting plaintiffs who
claim sexual harassment to rely on their subjective impressions of
ambiguous conduct.”240 This comment shows a lack of command of
sexual harassment law. As the court itself noted in the majority
opinion, the hostile environment test requires plaintiffs to prove that
the environment would be seen as hostile by a reasonable person—an
objective test.241 This is the classic legal mechanism for protecting
against a hypersensitive plaintiff.
Judge Tjoflat’s opinion also pointed out how the majority
misapplied Supreme Court precedent that requires courts to judge the
objective severity of an alleged harasser’s conduct from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,
considering “all the circumstances” (to quote Oncale v. Sundowner)242
or by “looking at all the circumstances” (to quote Harris v. Forklift).243
Instead, the Mendoza majority did what “every defense attorney” does
when faced with circumstantial evidence: “[I]solate each piece that the
other side puts into evidence and then attempt to trivialize it by taking
it out of context.”244 Judge Tjoflat continued, “[B]y examining each of
Mendoza’s allegations of harassment in isolation from one another,
the majority concludes that Mendoza does not have enough evidence
to reach the jury because each allegation is individually
insufficient.”245
A final limitation of the Mendoza majority opinion is its
excessive focus on whether the conduct involved was physically
threatening or humiliating. The majority contrasted the facts in
Mendoza with those in a case where female employees were held
down so that other employees could touch their breasts and legs.246
While that behavior is certainly physically threatening and
intimidating, the lack of similar behavior in Mendoza is irrelevant:
Harris v. Forklift did not require that conduct be physically
intimidating in order to constitute sexual harassment.247 As will be
240. Id. at 1255 (Carnes, J., concurring).
241. See id. at 1245-46 (majority opinion).
242. Id. at 1258 (Tjofalt, J., dissenting) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
243. Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1258 (Tjofalt, J., dissenting) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
244. Id. at 1262.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 1248 (citing Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th
Cir. 1988).
247. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
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discussed in more detail below, these words appeared only as part of
a non-inclusive list of factors that “may” exist, in the context of an
exhortation by the Supreme Court that lower courts should look at the
totality of the circumstances.248
2. Subsequent Courts Have Used Mendoza to Ratchet Up the
Standard for Sexual Harassment in the Eleventh Circuit
Despite deep disagreement on the panel that decided it,
numerous sub-cases cite Mendoza to ratchet up the standard for what
constitutes sexual harassment. In the 2010 case of Wallace v. Baker
Beauty, Inc., two plaintiffs were harassed by the head of their
company.249 The head of the company looked at his female sales
representatives and said: “I’ll tell you how I make my money off y’all:
I pimp out all my hoes”; commented that a stylist had a “nice ass”;
bragged about having sex with a particular woman and the types of
things he would do with her; called one plaintiff a “stupid bitch”
during a sales meeting; recited the phrase “jack each other off”; made
comments about a customer “looking sexy with those ta-tas hanging
out”; and laid on a hotel bed in front of one plaintiff and a customer,
unzipped his pants, and said to the plaintiff, “you know if you ever get
any fake boobs, you’re going to have to let me see and feel them.”250
The court used Mendoza to support its conclusion that the conduct was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive, neglecting to mention the
controlling reasonableness standard.251 The court granted summary
judgment for the employer.252
The 2010 case of Lindquist v. Fulton County involved a
detention officer harassed by her supervisor.253 The supervisor said
“Hon, I’ve got to do this,” and kissed her buttocks; grabbed her finger
as she wrote in a log book and said “Damn, you are so beautiful, why
don’t you come over here and sit on my lap?”; told her he wished he
was the chair she was sitting on so that she would be sitting on him;
commented he “wanted to make passionate love to her”; and asked
248. See id. at 23; see also supra notes 212-213.
249. See Wallace v. Baker Beauty, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-0290-JEO, 2010 WL
11565358, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 5, 2010).
250. Id. at *2-4.
251. See id. at *10 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 5, 2010).
252. See Id. at *12.
253. See generally Lindquist v. Fulton Cty., No. 1:09-CV-1102-RWS-WEJ,
2010 WL 11493834 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 23, 2010) report and recommendation adopted,
No. 1:09-CV-1102-RWS, 2011 WL 13175953 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2011).
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“what she would do if he just leaned over and kissed her.”254 The court
cited Mendoza to support its conclusion that the facts “d[id] not satisfy
the severe or pervasive harassment requirement,” characterizing the
facts as “inappropriate comments and one isolated incident.”255 The
court once again ignored controlling precedent on reasonableness and
granted summary judgment for the employer.256
In the 2016 case of Baldelamar v. Jefferson Southern
Corporation, the plaintiff’s coworker harassed her by telling her that
Mexicans shouldn’t shave their genitals, touching her buttocks,
hugging her from behind and pulling her close to his belly, using a
measuring tape to simulate his penis and telling her he had a big one,
standing behind her while she was working and making gestures as if
he was having sex with her, sticking his tongue out at her while
looking at her genitals, inviting her to a hotel to have sex, soliciting
her to accompany him into a tunnel at the workplace so he could have
sex with her, and more.257 The court cited Mendoza to once again
consider the “severe or pervasive” issue without considering whether
a reasonable jury could find an objectively hostile work
environment.258 The court noted only that the harassment “f[ell] far
short of the threshold level of ‘severe or pervasive’ conduct
established by Eleventh Circuit precedent” and adopted the
recommendation of the magistrate judge that summary judgment be
granted for the employer.259
These cases, and others among the over 1,100 cases that have
cited Mendoza, have ratcheted up the standard for what constitutes a
hostile environment in the Eleventh Circuit in ways that are
inconsistent with what reasonable people and juries would find today.
3. Eleventh Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today
Another oft-cited Eleventh Circuit case deserves more attention,
not only because it is more consonant with what reasonable people
would consider sexual harassment today, but also because it provides
254. Id. at *5-6.
255. Id. at *12.
256. See id.
257. See Baldelamar v. Jefferson S. Corp., No. 415CV00209HLMWEJ, 2016
WL 9330869, at *6-9 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2016) report and recommendation adopted,
No. 415CV00209HLMWEJ, 2016 WL 9331114 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2016).
258. See id.
259. Id. at *13.
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an important corrective to a common misinterpretation of Harris v.
Forklift.260
Allen v. Tyson Foods has been cited 2,651 times, yet the vast
majority of those citations use Allen to discuss civil procedure
standards for summary judgment.261 Only 165 cases cite Allen on the
issue of hostile work environment sexual harassment, and this aspect
of the case deserves to be cited more. Allen involved a poultry
processing plant in Alabama that was “engulfed by an atmosphere of
improper sexuality” involving sexual intercourse at the plant, sexually
graphic jokes, vulgar and sexually demeaning language, groping,
exhibiting of genitalia and buttocks, and using chicken parts to mimic
sexual organs and activities.262 The plaintiff’s supervisor wrote her at
least five sexually explicit notes, and the plaintiff claimed she was
“intimidated and harassed” by her supervisor and other employees.263
The Eleventh Circuit properly referred to the Supreme Court’s
“totality of the circumstances” test; but even more important is the
court’s language about whether sexual harassment needs to be
“physically threatening or humiliating” in order to constitute a hostile
work environment.264
That language comes from the Supreme Court’s Harris v.
Forklift, which says that the factors for assessing whether an
environment is hostile “may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”265
The Allen court correctly noted that the “Supreme Court has provided
a non-exclusive set of factors to consider.”266 Too often, as in
Mendoza, courts act inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court
precedent and with what most reasonable people believe today by
treating the plaintiff’s failure to prove that the harassing behavior was
physically threatening as per se proof that what occurred was not
serious enough to constitute sexual harassment.267
260. See generally Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
261. See generally Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642 (1997); see also
supra note 86.
262. Id. at 645.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 647.
265. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
266. Allen, 121 F.3d at 647 (holding simply that genuine issues of material
fact existed on the issue of whether the environment was sufficiently hostile to
constitute actionable harassment).
267. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d at 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999).
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Accordingly, courts in the Eleventh Circuit should look to Allen
as an important corrective to cases that use the factors listed in Harris
v. Forklift to ratchet up the standard, in effect holding that sexual
harassment exists only when the behavior involved is truly threatening
or intimidating.268 This misinterpretation of the plain language of
Harris v. Forklift clearly reflects the now-outdated view that sexual
harassment is not serious unless it contains an element of threats or
violence. Recall that violence is no longer required even for proof of
rape.269
C. The Seventh Circuit: Baskerville v. Culligan and Its Progeny
1. Baskerville v. Culligan
A third commonly cited case is Baskerville v. Culligan
International Company, which has been cited 852 times since it was
decided in 1995.270 This Seventh Circuit opinion was written by Judge
Richard Posner, who announced himself “reluctant to upset a jury
verdict challenged only for resting on insufficient evidence” yet
managed to soldier on and do so.271 Judge Posner found for the
employer as a matter of law on the following facts.272
Valerie Baskerville was a secretary in the marketing department
of a Chicago manufacturer of products for treating water.273 Her
manager was Michael Hall who, Judge Posner said, “we assume
truthfully” engaged in an unending series of puerile attempts at sexual
humor.274 When Baskerville asked if he had gotten a Valentine’s Day
card for his wife (who had not yet moved to Chicago), he responded
by miming masturbation.275 Once when Baskerville wore a leather
skirt, Hall grunted “um um um” in a way she interpreted as sexual.276
When the public address system began, “May I have your attention
please,” Hall went to Baskerville’s desk and said, “You know what

268. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
269. See JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 871, 887 (7th ed. 2012).
270. See generally Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir.
1995); see also supra note 26.
271. Id. at 430.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. Id.
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that means, don’t you? All pretty girls run around naked.”277 When
Baskerville commented that Hall’s office was hot, Hall raised his
eyebrows and said, “Not until you stepped your foot in here.”278 When
she brought him a document to sign, instead of treating her as a
colleague with a job to do, he said: “There’s always a pretty girl giving
me something to sign off on.”279 He told her his wife had told him that
he had better clean up his act and “better think of you as Ms. Anita
Hill,” an evident admission that Hall’s wife believed he was sexually
harassing Baskerville (and he didn’t seem to disagree).280 Hall told
Baskerville that he had left the Christmas party early because he
“didn’t want to lose control” with so many pretty girls there.281
The jury thought that a reasonable person would find this
environment hostile and found for Baskerville.282 Judge Posner
overturned the jury verdict in an opinion that reflected three outdated
norms: (1) that sexual harassment is not serious or that it can be taken
seriously only when the behaviors complained of make the workplace
“hellish”; (2) that women who accuse men of sexual harassment are
not credible; and (3) that (instead of having a zero-tolerance policy)
employers are free to tolerate sexual harassment so long as it comes in
the form of lame jokes.283
Judge Posner wrote off Hall’s sexual comments as merely
“boorish” and asserted that the “concept of sexual harassment is
designed to protect working women from the kind of male attentions
that can make the workplace hellish.”284 Judge Posner continued, “He
never touched the plaintiff. He did not invite her, explicitly or by
implication, to have sex with him . . . He made no threats. He did not
expose himself, or show her dirty pictures.”285 This entirely misses the
#MeToo point: When women show up for work, they are entitled to
be treated as colleagues, not sexual opportunities.
Judge Posner diminished the harassment experienced by
Baskerville by comparing it to sexual assault: “On the one side lie
sexual assaults . . . on the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter,

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 431.
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tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers.”286 “It is
difficult to imagine a context that would render Hall’s sallies
threatening or otherwise deeply disturbing.”287 Once again, a court
misread Harris v. Forklift to support the view that inappropriate
workplace behavior is not sexual harassment unless it is truly
threatening, and once again, a court ignored the Harris reasonableness
standard.288
Judge Posner’s characterization of Hall’s behavior as “boorish,”
often repeated by the courts, comes close to the “boys will be boys”
attitude that long has been used to excuse male misbehavior.289 The
Baskerville jury rejected this even in the early 1990s, and it is even
more unlikely that a contemporary jury would accept it today.290
Also intriguing is Judge Posner’s aside, “we assume truthfully”
when reciting the plaintiff’s allegations.291 The opinion contains no
reference to an allegation by the employer that the plaintiff was
lying.292 It is true that the relevant procedural standard is that a judge
overturning a jury verdict must take all inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, but that is different from having a judge, sua sponte
and without evidence, raise questions about a plaintiff’s
truthfulness.293 Did Posner’s aside reflect the stereotype, still common
in 1995, that women who complained of sexual harassment cannot be
trusted?294 If so, this is another way in which Baskerville is inconsistent
with what a reasonable jury would likely believe today.295
Judge Posner made much of the fact that Hall was “a man whose
sense of humor took final shape in adolescence.”296 But a lame sense
of humor is not a defense in a sexual harassment case. Even if Judge
Posner’s views reflected what a reasonable person and jury might
286. Id. at 430.
287. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430-31.
288. See Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (discussing the
reasonableness standard used to evaluate whether words or conduct constitutes sexual
harassment).
289. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 430.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. See Williams & Lebsock, supra note 78 (noting that women have long
been stereotyped as making false reports of sexual harassment in the workplace).
295. See Graf, supra note 69 (asserting that less than a third of Americans
think that false accusations of sexual harassment are a major problem); see also Marist
Poll, supra note 82 (finding that nearly two-thirds of individuals polled say that the
accuser is more likely than the accused to be believed).
296. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431.
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think in 1995—though they appear not to—they clearly do not reflect
what a jury would likely believe now that 96% of women and 86% of
men believe that touching or groping constitutes sexual harassment,
and 86% of women and 70% of men now feel that making sexual
comments about someone’s body is sexual harassment.297
2. Subsequent Courts Have Used Baskerville to Ratchet Up the
Standard for Sexual Harassment in the Seventh Circuit
Baskerville has been widely cited to heighten the standard for
what constitutes an actionable hostile work environment in the
Seventh Circuit. In the 2007 case of Britz v. White, a female plaintiff
was harassed by a female supervisor who, when she was standing at
her desk leaning over to write something, slapped her on the
buttocks.298 When the plaintiff said, “Hey, that was my butt,” the
supervisor responded, “[O]h, I know. It was just sticking out there,
though.”299 Once, when the plaintiff was standing in her cubicle
wearing a skirt, the supervisor grabbed the bottom of her skirt and
tugged it.300 The supervisor also came up behind the plaintiff and
tugged her hair, poked her in the side, and told her “I love you so
much.”301 The court cited Baskerville to support the contention that
“the concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working
women from the kind of . . . attentions that can make the workplace
hellish.”302 Relying on Baskerville’s proposition that on one side is
sexual assaults, nonconsensual physical contact, and uninvited
solicitations, while on the other side is vulgar banter, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence that a
reasonable jury could find that the conduct was objectively severe or
pervasive and granted summary judgment for the employer.303
In the 2008 case of Enriquez v. United States Cellular
Corporation, four plaintiffs were harassed by their manager.304 The
manager asked the first to lie across his desk in lingerie; told her
297. BARNA, supra note 73.
298. See Britz v. White, No. 06-3210, 2007 WL 4556700, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Dec.
21, 2007).
299. Id.
300. See id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at *3 (quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th
Cir. 1994)).
303. See id. at *3, *5.
304. See Enriquez v. United States Cellular Corp., No. 06 C 3135, 2008 WL
4925012, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2008).
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“those . . . pants look good on your ass”; “you have a nice body”;
“[your] tits are going to look nice in that shirt”; and attempted to kiss
her.305 He told the second plaintiff “you’ve got a nice ass”; asked to see
her breasts several times; and asked “when are you going to let me lick
your tits?”306 The third plaintiff he approached at a Christmas party,
“pushed her legs open, and picked her up to dance, holding her with
her legs around his waist for [about] thirty seconds.”307 The manager
also sent her text messages, including one that said that she “had a bad
boy for a boss and she didn’t know the things he could do with her,”
told her he wanted to go out for drinks and “get her drunk so he could
take advantage of her and have her do things that would probably
cause trouble for him,” and told her “you look good enough to eat right
now.”308 He called the fourth plaintiff and asked when they were going
to “hook up,” twice lifted her up by grasping the outside of her thighs
and called her “juicy,” and twice tried to kiss her.309 The court cited
Baskerville to hold that “a few advances,” comments, and
“one . . . brief contact” did not create an objectively hostile work
environment, and the court granted summary judgment for the
employer.310
These cases show the way courts have cited Baskerville to
preclude a finding of sexual harassment in the context of facts that are
even more egregious than those involved Baskerville. If Baskerville
itself is inconsistent with what a reasonable person or jury would find
today, its progeny are even more so.
3. Seventh Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today
Two often-cited Seventh Circuit cases are more consistent than
Baskerville with Supreme Court precedent and with what reasonable
people believe today.

305. Id. at *1.
306. Id. at *2.
307. Id. at *3.
308. Id. at *2-3.
309. Id. at *3.
310. Id. at *10-15 (discussing each plaintiff’s case under the Baskerville
objective standard).
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a. Hostetler v. Quality Dining
Hostetler v. Quality Dining, which has been cited 312 times,
involved the assistant manager of a restaurant whose fellow assistant
manager “grabbed her face one day at work and stuck his tongue down
her throat.”311 The next day when he tried again, she put her head
between her knees, at which point he started unfastening her bra.312
During the same week, he approached her while she was serving
customers at the counter and told her, “in crude terms, that he could
perform oral sex on her so effectively that ‘[she] would do
cartwheels.’”313 When she reported him, she was transferred to another
restaurant that required a long commute and a redeye shift that got her
home most nights at 4:00 a.m.314 She received counseling for the
trauma and was taking Prozac at the time of her deposition.315 The trial
court granted summary judgment for the employer on the grounds that
what happened was not severe.316
The Fifth Circuit noted that, while Title VII is not a “general
civility code,”317
We have no doubt that the type of conduct at issue here falls on the
actionable side of the line dividing abusive conduct from behavior that is
merely vulgar or mildly offensive. . . . Having a coworker insert his tongue
into one’s mouth without invitation and having one’s brassiere nearly
removed is not conduct that would be anticipated in the workplace, and
certainly not in a family restaurant. A reasonable person in Hostetler’s
position might well experience that type of behavior as humiliating, and
quite possibly threatening. . . . Even the lewd remark . . . was more than a
casual obscenity. . . . These were not, in sum, petty vulgarities with the
potential to annoy but not to objectively transform the workplace to a degree
that implicates Title VII.318

The Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment: “Holding such acts not to be severe as a matter of law is
another way of saying that no reasonable person could think them
serious enough to alter the plaintiff’s work environment.”319 In the case
at hand, “[a] factfinder reasonably could interpret the alleged course
311. Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000); see
also supra note 86.
312. See id. at 802.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 804.
315. See id. at 805.
316. See id.
317. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
318. Hostetler, 218 F.3d at 807-08.
319. Id. at 808-09.
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of conduct as sufficiently invasive, humiliating, and threatening to
poison Hostetler’s working environment.”320 Hostetler is an admirably
clear and thoughtful application of the reasonable person standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift.321
b. Smith v. Sheahan
Smith v. Sheahan, which has been cited 204 times, involved a
prison guard in the Cook County Jail, Ronald Gamble, who violently
assaulted a fellow guard, Valeria Smith, calling her a “bitch,”
threatening to “fuck [her] up,” and pinning her against a wall while
twisting her wrist so severely she needed corrective surgery to repair
her ligaments.322 Gamble was convicted of criminal battery and placed
under court supervision, but when Smith complained to her employer,
she was advised to “kiss and make up.”323 The trial court awarded
summary judgment for the employer on the grounds that the incidents
were “too isolated to be actionable.”324 Smith provided affidavits from
six other female guards recounting a total of seven incidents where
Gamble was verbally abusive or physically threatening of female
colleagues.325 After Gamble’s conviction, he was promoted, and Smith
received a transfer she considered “tantamount to a demotion.”326 The
trial court granted summary judgment for Gamble, “partially
discount[ing] the seriousness of Gamble’s misconduct because Smith
‘voluntarily’ stepped into the ‘aggressive setting’ of the jail.”327
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a “jury would also be
entitled to conclude that the assault Smith suffered was severe enough
to alter the terms of her employment even though it was a single
incident.”328 The court noted that jurors are expected to bring their
common sense to assess what behavior is appropriate in a given social
setting.329 The court rejected the defendant’s contention that an assault
must be sexual to qualify as sexual harassment, pointing out that
hostile behavior based on sex is prohibited by Title VII even when the
320.
321.
322.

Id. at 809.
See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1999); see also supra note

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
See id. at 532.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 533.
See id. at 535.
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behavior is not sexual. The court also rejected the employer’s
contention that Smith consented to violence by choosing to work in
the “aggressive setting” of a jail.330
While both Hostetler and Smith involve extreme behavior—far
beyond what occurs in most sexual harassment cases or what Supreme
Court precedent requires to sustain a case—both signal a healthy
respect for the role of the jury in cases where the touchstone is what a
reasonable person would consider inappropriate workplace behavior.
D. The Sixth Circuit: Bowman v. Shawnee State University and Its
Progeny
1. Bowman v. Shawnee State University
Bowman v. Shawnee State University is a Sixth Circuit opinion
involving sexual harassment of a man by a woman that has been cited
712 times.331 As in many of the other cases-in-chief, the judges did not
allow a jury to decide this case.332 The Sixth Circuit opinion affirmed
a grant of summary judgment to the employer.333
Thomas E. Bowman, a part-time instructor teaching health and
physical education courses, filed sexual harassment claims against
Shawnee State University and Dr. Jessica J. Jahnke, the then Dean of
Education.334 At a Christmas party, Jahnke grabbed Bowman’s
buttocks.335 He said that if someone were to do that to her, she would
fire him or her, to which she responded that “she controlled his ass and
she would do whatever she wanted with it.”336 At work, Jahnke rubbed
his shoulder; he jerked away and said, “No.”337 Jahnke kept calling him
at home and twice invited Bowman to her house to go with her into
her whirlpool and her swimming pool; she propositioned him
repeatedly, ignoring his clear statements that he was not interested.338
When Bowman confronted Jahnke, she accused him of lying, put her
finger on his chest, and pushed him towards the door; he responded,
330. Id. at 534-35.
331. See Bowman v. Shawnee State University, 220 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2000);
see also supra note 86.
332. See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 456.
333. See id. at 465.
334. See id. at 456, 458.
335. See id. at 459.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 458-59.
338. See id. at 459.

184

Michigan State Law Review

2019

“This is the last time you’re ever going to touch me.”339 In addition to
the sexual harassment allegations, Bowman also alleged that she
treated him differently because of his sex, imposing requirements on
him that she did not impose on women.340
Bowman reflects three outdated norms: (1) that groping and
persistent sexual comments and propositions do not necessarily
constitute sexual harassment; (2) that (instead of zero tolerance)
employers are free to allow supervisors to grope and proposition those
they supervise; and (3) that only women can be sexually harassed.
Like Mendoza, Bowman involved sexual harassment with a
strong undercurrent of abusive bullying. In addition to the sexual
harassment, Bowman alleged that Jahnke: wrote a memorandum
chastising Bowman for missing a class when he had not done so;
chastised him for missing a meeting that was not required and was
scheduled at a time he was teaching; and asked him to come over to
her house and repair her deck.341 The court acknowledged that the
defendant “tormented” the plaintiff, but it treated this as irrelevant to
his sexual harassment claim.342 But researchers in sociology,
management science, psychology, and human resources journals have
documented that sometimes sexual harassment is part and parcel of a
pattern of aggression and bullying.343 The #MeToo movement and
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 464.
See generally JEFF HEARN & WENDY PARKIN, GENDER, SEXUALITY AND
VIOLENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE UNSPOKEN FORCES OF ORGANIZATION VIOLATIONS
(2001). See generally Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: Violence Against
Women in the Workplace, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1070 (1993) (identifying sexual
harassment as a form of violence against women); Carol Jones, Drawing Boundaries:
Exploring the Relationship Between Sexual Harassment, Gender and Bullying, 29
WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 147 (2006); Anne M. O’Leary-Kelly et al., Sexual
Harassment as Aggressive Behavior: An Actor-Based Perspective, 25 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 372 (2000) (asserting that sexual harassment is one form of aggressive
behavior); Rebecca A. Thacker & Gerald R. Ferris, Understanding Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace: The Influence of Power and Politics within the Dyadic
Interaction of Harasser and Target, 1 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 23 (1991)
(asserting sexual harassment as a power dynamic); Christopher Uggen & Amy
Blackstone, Sexual Harassment as a Gendered Expression of Power, 69 AM. SOC.
REV. 64 (2004) (noting sexual harassment as a gendered expression of power); Dacher
Keltner, Sex, Power, and the Systems That Enable Men Like Harvey Weinstein, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/sex-power-and-the-systems-thatenable-men-like-harvey-weinstein [https://perma.cc/WNN8-24SY]; Zoe Williams,
Sexual harassment 101: what everyone needs to know, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/16/facts-sexual-harassment-
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some courts have added an important dimension, highlighting that
sexual harassment is, at its core, about the abuse of power.344 All this
should inform courts’ discussions of bullying as part of a pattern of
sexual harassment in the future.
The Bowman court discounted much of the evidence presented
on the grounds that Bowman had not shown that the non-sexual
conduct he complains of had anything to do with his gender.345 While
he may have been subject to intimidation, ridicule, and mistreatment,
he did not show that he was treated in a discriminatory manner because
he was male.346
In cases involving women, plaintiffs have not been required to
prove that the reason for sexual behavior toward them was that they
were women, and it is not clear what such proof would look like.347
Does a boss have to announce, “I am grabbing your butt (or making
you fix my deck) because you are a woman/man”?
The Bowman court’s incredulity in the face of the argument that
a man could be the subject of sexual harassment and its consequent
imposition of a double standard are both inconsistent with newer
understandings of sexual harassment incident to #MeToo. While most
of the early highly publicized cases of sexual harassment involved
women, more recent stories have highlighted that people of all genders
encounter sexual harassment.348 The belief that sexually harassed men
just “got lucky” perpetuates harmful stereotypes of men as always
ready for sex and women as always coy. The Supreme Court has

workplace-harvey-weinstein [https://perma.cc/3D4Y-E92H]; Raj Persaud & Peter
Bruggen, What Is the Link Between Sex and Power in Sexual Harassment?, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Nov. 08, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/slightlyblighty/201711/what-is-the-link-between-sex-and-power-in-sexual-harassment
[https://perma.cc/QFV3-JBD9].
344. See Grace Donnelly, Anita Hill: Companies Should Treat Sexual
Harassment as an Abuse of Power, FORTUNE (Dec. 13, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/12/12/anita-hill-sexual-harassment/
[https://perma.cc/K4EY-A97F]. See, e.g., Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533 (1999)
(“It makes no difference that the assaults and the epithets sounded more like
expressions of sex-based animus rather than misdirected sexual desire (although
power plays may lie just below the surface of much of the latter behavior as well.)”).
345. See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 464.
346. See id. at 464.
347. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
348. See, e.g., Bernstein et al., supra note 66; Michael Paulson, Kevin Spacey
Issues Apology to Actor After Sexual Accusation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/theater/kevin-spacey-gay-anthony-rapp.html
[https://perma.cc/98DP-FBPX].

186

Michigan State Law Review

2019

decried this kind of gender stereotyping since the 1970s—for men as
well as women.349
The trial court found that the Christmas party incident, the
whirlpool incident, and the swimming pool incident were sufficiently
imbued with a sexual flavor to be sexual harassment, but that the
harassment was “not nearly as severe or pervasive” as in earlier cases
where no sexual harassment had been found, including one case that
involved battery.350 This is a classic example of the infinite regression
of anachronism where, again, the court relied on past cases without
making the core reasonableness inquiry required by the Supreme
Court.351
2. Subsequent Courts Have Used Bowman to Ratchet Up the
Standard for Sexual Harassment in the Sixth Circuit
Subsequent cases have cited Bowman to deprive plaintiffs of
their right to have a jury assess whether a reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s shoes would find an environment hostile. In the 2003 case
of Hudson v. M.S. Carriers, Inc., the plaintiff was harassed by her
supervisor’s boss.352 He asked her what kind of panties she was
wearing; told her about going to a strip club and swiping the stripper’s
rear end with his credit card; and called her into his office to show her
his “fake penis,” which was a pencil which he put close to his
genitals.353 Twice, he took off his shoes and touched the plaintiff with
his feet, and once, he wetted his finger and stuck it in her ear, saying
he wanted to “make Oreo cookies,” which she understood to mean he
desired sex.354 On numerous other occasions, he touched her in an
“offensive and unwanted manner.”355
The court cited Bowman for the proposition that a hostile work
environment exists when the workplace is “permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
349. See generally Joan C. Williams, Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender
Revolution: Justice Ginsburg and Reconstructive Feminism, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1267
(2012) (noting that under the influence of Ruth Bader Ginsberg, the Supreme Court
has decried gender stereotypes since the 1970s).
350. Bowman, 220 F.3d at 464.
351. See id.
352. See Hudson v. M.S. Carriers, Inc., 335 F. Supp.2d 853, 856 (W.D. Tenn.
2003), aff’d, 126 F. App’x 297 (6th Cir. 2005).
353. Id. at 857.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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and create an abusive working environment.”356 Relaying the facts of
Bowman, the court stated that the behavior was “boorish” but not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to survive summary judgment.357 The
court went on to state that just because some of the incidents involved
physical invasion, that “[did] not in and of itself militate a finding of
hostile environment.”358 Consequently, the court granted summary
judgment for the employer.359
In the 2009 case of Talley v. United Parcel Service, the
plaintiff’s coworker harassed her.360 Once he “look[ed] at her private
area” and asked her “when you going to leave that old man and get
some of this sexy bowleggedness?”361 Twice he rubbed the plaintiff’s
arm, once while looking at her private parts and saying “you know you
got some money.”362 An unspecified number of times, he looked at the
plaintiff’s “private area” and said inappropriate things and was
generally flirtatious.363 The court cited Bowman and stated that in the
present case, the conduct was comparable or less frequent and severe
than in Bowman.364 The court said that “[a]lthough it appear[ed] [the]
flirtatious or inappropriate behavior occurred more frequently than the
three instances of harassment th[e] Plaintiff specifically allege[d], this
behavior also appear[ed] to be less severe.”365 Furthermore, the
plaintiff did not allege that any of the behavior was physically
threatening.366 Thus, the conduct did not rise to the level of severe or
pervasive harassment sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment
claim. Once again, the court’s analysis failed to conduct the required
reasonableness analyses. The court granted the employer’s motion for
summary judgment.367

356. Id. at 859 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
357. Id. at 862.
358. Id.
359. See id.
360. Talley v. United Parcel Serv., No. 08-2282, 2009 WL 10698644, at *1
(W.D. Tenn. May 26, 2009).
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See id. at *4.
365. Id.
366. See id.
367. See id.
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3. Sixth Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today
A case that deserves to be cited more frequently is Williams v.
General Motors.368 It is already influential, as it has been cited 833
times.369 Marilyn Williams, who worked for General Motors for more
than thirty years, alleged that she encountered comments such as “hey
slut,” “I’m sick and tired of these fucking women,” and “[y]ou left the
dick out of the hand,” and propositions to “rub up against me anytime”
and “back right up to me.”370 Williams said she also was subjected to
constant hazing, such as having a room padlocked while she was
inside it, having forms glued to the top of her desk, and having
equipment moved to block entrances she needed to use.371
Williams points out that after Faragher v. Boca Raton and
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, employers have a duty to take
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct sexually harassing
behavior.372 The Sixth Circuit criticized the lower court for dismissing
the incidents as “infrequent, not severe, not threatening or humiliating,
but merely offensive.”373 The court also stressed that the “subjective
test must not be construed as requiring that a plaintiff feel physically
threatened.”374 This is an important corrective to some courts’ misuse
of oft-quoted language in Harris v. Forklift listing factors that “may”
occur in sexual harassment cases.375 The Williams court also correctly
identified that the comments about sluts and fucking women “could
be viewed by a jury as humiliating and fundamentally offensive to any
woman” and “go[t] to the core of Williams’s entitlement to a
workplace free of discriminatory animus.”376
Williams also astutely recognized that the hazing behavior
dismissed by the district court as “pranks” “could well be viewed as
work-sabotaging behavior that creates a hostile work environment,”
particularly when accompanied by “threatening language and sexually

368. See generally Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir.
1999).
369. See id.; see also supra note 86.
370. Williams, 187 F.3d at 559.
371. Id.
372. See id. at 567. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
373. Williams, 187 F.3d at 561.
374. Id. at 566 (emphasis in original).
375. See Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
376. Williams, 187 F.3d at 563.
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aggressive innuendo.”377 Studies of sexual harassment in blue-collar
jobs report that razzing and hazing is commonplace in such jobs
(often, but not always, accompanied by inappropriate sexual behavior)
that can create a hostile work environment.378
Williams criticized the lower court for having “disaggregated the
plaintiff’s claims contrary to the Supreme Court’s ‘totality of
circumstances’ directives, which robbed the incidents of their
cumulative effect.”379 The issue, said the court, “is not whether each
incident of harassment standing alone is sufficient to sustain the cause
of action in a hostile environment case, but whether—taken together—
the reported incidents make out such a case.”380 “This totality-ofcircumstances examination should be viewed as the most basic tenet
of the hostile-work-environment cause of action.”381
Williams deserves to be even more widely cited than it is. It is
more consistent than Bowman with Supreme Court precedent and with
what a reasonable person and jury today would believe constitutes
sexual harassment.
E. The Fifth Circuit: Shepherd v. Comptroller and Its Progeny
1. Shepherd v. Comptroller
The final case-in-chief is Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public
Accounts, a Fifth Circuit opinion that has been cited 584 times.382
Shepherd reflects four outdated norms: (1) that sexualized touching is
not sexual harassment; (2) that comments, up to and including “your
elbows are the color of your nipples,” are “mere utterance[s]” that
women need to take in stride; (3) that sexual harassment is not serious
unless it is physically threatening; and (4) that (instead of zero
tolerance) employers are free to tolerate sexual harassment so long as
it does not “destroy . . . [women’s] opportunity to succeed in the
workplace.”383
377. Id. at 564.
378. See generally JAMES E. GRUBER & PHOEBE MORGAN, IN THE COMPANY
OF MEN: MALE DOMINANCE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT (2005) (exploring the ways
sexual harassment affects blue-collar women).
379. Williams, 187 F.3d at 561.
380. Id. at 562 (emphasis in original).
381. Id. at 563.
382. See generally Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accountants, 168 F.3d
871 (5th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 86.
383. Id. at 872.
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Plaintiff’s coworker, Jodie Moore, assaulted Debra Jean
Shepherd for two years after she got engaged to Moore’s brother-inlaw.384 Moore patted his lap and told Shepherd, “[h]ere’s your seat,”
and announced, “your elbows are the same color as your nipples.”385
Moore told Shepherd she had big thighs and “simulated looking under
her dress.”386 He also tried repeatedly to look down her top and stroked
her arm in an apparently sexual way, rubbing a hand from her shoulder
down to her wrist.387
The court noted that “Shepherd testified that Moore never
propositioned her, asked her out on a date, or suggested that he would
like to sleep with her.”388 But of course that is irrelevant: Shepherd
alleged a hostile work environment, not quid pro quo harassment.389
Irrelevant, too, is that Moore “had a friendly relation” with Shepherd
outside of work.390 Because Moore was engaged to Shepherd’s
brother-in-law, Moore could have been under family pressures to keep
up appearances.391
Because the employer took prompt and effective remedial
action, the plaintiff lost.392 But what is troubling—and influential—is
the court’s holding that Moore’s behavior did not create a hostile
environment because it was not something a reasonable person might
find to be sexual harassment.393 “We agree with Shepherd that the
comments made by Moore were boorish and offensive. The
comments, however, were not severe.”394 The court wrote off the
“nipples” comment as a “mere utterance of an epithet that engender[s]
offensive feelings.”395 The court thereby communicated that women
should just take such comments in stride.396
384. See id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See id. The Authors have made reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff (namely that the stroking could be read as sexual) given that this case
involved a summary judgment motion brought by the employer.
388. Id.
389. See id. Quid pro quo sexual harassment is “sleep with me or you’re fired”
sexual harassment. The legal test requires the plaintiff to prove that the harassment
related to sex, was unwelcome, and adversely affected a term or condition of
employment. See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int’l., 793 F.2d 714, 721 (5th Cir. 1986).
390. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 872.
391. See id.
392. See id. at 875.
393. See id. at 874.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 872, 874.
396. See id. at 874.
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However, it wasn’t just the comment. The court wrote off the
physical touching as “too tepid” on the grounds it was not “physically
threatening.”397 This court, too, misused the language from Harris v.
Forklift, which merely listed physically threatening conduct as a factor
that “may” (or may not) exist in sexual harassment cases.398 Again, the
court relied on the outdated understanding that sexual harassment is
not serious unless it is downright frightening.399 This is a far cry from
the controlling standard, as articulated by the Supreme Court, that
sexual harassment is triggered long before a plaintiff suffers from
psychological harm.400
Recall that the “tepid” conduct was a coworker running his hand
down Shepherd’s arm from her shoulder to her wrist, making
comments about her nipples, repeatedly trying or miming looking up
her skirt and down her shirt.401 It is not clear how any of this conduct
could be read as anything other than sexually aggressive.402 It is highly
unlikely that a reasonable person or jury would agree with the
Shepherd court’s conclusion today.
In a classic example of the infinite regression of anachronism,
the court compares what happened to Shepherd as “far less
objectionable” than cases of true and actionable sexual harassment
involving a female employee who was “sexually groped repeatedly”403
and an “environment where male coworkers cornered women and
rubbed their thighs, grabbed their breasts, and held a woman so that a
man could touch her.”404 This again reflects an era when gardenvariety sexual harassment was viewed as not serious—as something
any woman worth her salt could and should deal with on her own.
Assuming that sentiment reflected what a reasonable person or jury
would have believed in the late 1990s, it does not reflect what they
likely would believe today.405

397. Id.
398. Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993).
399. See generally id.
400. See id. at 22.
401. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874.
402. See BARNA, supra note 73 (finding that 86% of women and 70% of men
believe that making sexual comments about someone’s body is sexual harassment).
403. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874-875 (citing Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875
F.2d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 1989)).
404. Id. at 875 (citing Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir.
1988)).
405. See Jackson, supra note 29.
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2. Subsequent Courts Have Used Shepherd to Ratchet Up the
Standard for Sexual Harassment in the Fifth Circuit
Shepherd has been widely cited to heighten the standard for
hostile environment in the Fifth Circuit, which one commentator
called “perhaps the most aggressive circuit affirming grants of
summary judgments” in hostile environment cases.406 Shepherd is
cited in cases that involve threats and sexual assaults far in excess of
what occurred in Shepherd.407
In 2004, the Eastern District of Louisiana relied on Shepherd to
grant summary judgment for the employer in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Rite Aid Corporation, which involved a
plaintiff harassed by two co-workers.408 One cupped her breast and
backed her into a corner of the store three times; asked for her phone
number and threatened to come to her house (which might well make
a reasonable woman fear for her safety); commented on her body; and
told her numerous times that she better not gain weight.409 A second
coworker also threatened to come to her house and rubbed his finger
across the back of her neck, causing her to jump.410 He pinched her
thigh, tried to kiss her, and twice brushed up against her and said, “I
wonder what it feel [sic] like.”411 He also walked close to her, looked
her up and down and made remarks under his breath, commented how
fine and pretty she was, commented how nice her chest was, and asked
her what she slept in at night.412
The court, which also had evidence of inappropriate conduct
towards other female employees, cited Shepherd to say that totality of
circumstances did not add up to sexual harassment because Title VII
only bars conduct so severe or pervasive it “destroys . . . [the]
opportunity to succeed in the workplace.”413 The court excused the
conduct as merely “offensive and sophomoric” but not severe or
pervasive enough to alter the terms or conditions of employment.414
406. Medina, supra note 126, at 351.
407. See generally E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., No. CIV.A. 03-2079, 2004 WL
1488578 (E.D. La. June 30, 2004).
408. E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., No. CIV.A. 03-2079, 2004 WL 1488578
(E.D. La. June 30, 2004).
409. See id. at *1-2.
410. See id.
411. Id. (implying that the plaintiff believed this to be a reference to what it
would feel like to have sex with her).
412. See id. at *1-2.
413. Id. at *6.
414. Id. at *5.
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Despite the sexual assaults by two colleagues, the court said the
coworker’s conduct was the equivalent to the “‘mere utterance of an
epithet that engender[s] offensive feelings.”415 The court admitted that
the conduct was “quite unwelcome” but not severe or physically
threatening, despite the assaults and threats to come to the plaintiff’s
house.416 This was not the kind of “extreme conduct” that would render
a work environment objectively hostile or abusive.417 Despite
acknowledging that the issue was whether a reasonable jury could find
a hostile environment, the court inexplicably prevented the extreme
facts of this case from reaching a jury based on its reading of
Shepherd.418
In the 2006 case of Chelette v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., yet another plaintiff was harassed by a supervisor, who
twice tried to kiss the plaintiff when they were alone together in a car
for business reasons, after she had clearly indicated her lack of
interest.419 He also talked about his lack of a sex life and asked whether
she had ever thought about having an affair; commented that another
co-worker was lucky because he had affairs with young college
women; brought her a sheer swimsuit as a gift after a trip to Hawaii;
and kept touching her, including trying to kiss her, massaging her
shoulder repeatedly, brushing his arm against her breast perhaps more
than ten times.420 He stared at her breasts; commented that “she was
proportioned nicely” and her husband was lucky; and “commented
about her body and how he liked to watch her walk away.”421 The court
relayed the facts of Shepherd as one of several comparison cases and
said the allegations in the present case “simply do not rise to the level
of severe or pervasive conduct required for recovery.”422 The court
granted summary judgment for the employer.423
One year later, Hancock v. Barron Builders & Management
Company, Inc. involved three plaintiffs alleging harassment by the

415. Id. (quoting Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871,
874 (5th Cir. 1999)).
416. Id. at *6.
417. Id.
418. See id. at *6-7.
419. See Chelette v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CIVA 04-2440, 2006
WL 2513918, at *2 (W.D. La. Aug. 29, 2006).
420. See id. at *9.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. See id. at 12.
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company president.424 The president described his use of sex toys and
demonstrated which positions he preferred; discussed having sex with
his wife, referring to her in terms too “demeaning” to be repeated by
the court; talked about videotaping his sexual encounters; talked about
the number of sex partners he had; graphically described situations
where he date-raped women in college; asked for an opinion on
Hispanics as sexual partners; requested one plaintiff come to his house
in a bikini; and once entered the plaintiff’s office and began to take off
his shirt.425 The court cited Shepherd to write off this conduct as
“[o]ccasional comments, discourtesy, rudeness, or isolated incidents”
that, “unless extremely serious,” were insufficient to establish sexual
harassment.426 “Title VII is intended only to prohibit . . . conduct . . . ’
so severe or pervasive that it destroys . . . opportunity to succeed in
the workplace,’” asserted the court—a standard inconsistent with the
Supreme Court standard of reasonableness.427 The president’s
comments were “boorish and offensive” but “not so severe or
pervasive as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of the plaintiffs’
employment,” said the court, granting summary judgment for the
employer.428
Another 2007 case, Combs v. Exxon Mobile Corporation,
involved a plaintiff harassed by a co-worker who pressed his genitals
against her buttocks, touched her breasts, and tried to hug her.429 He
also asked “do you want me?” more than three times; asked why the
plaintiff didn’t find him attractive; told her he “wanted her” and that
she aroused him; told her that he dreamt about her at night; said, “I
wish I was the sweat that rolls down your neck between your breasts”;
told her frequently, “I don’t know why I want to have sex with you”;
told her he could wear down her determination to have a platonic
relationship; and told her, “that sweat looks so good, I can lick the
sweat off of you.”430 The court admitted that the conduct was
“sophomoric” and “to a reasonable person the conduct would be quite
unwelcome” but cited Shepherd to support its conclusion that it was
424. Hancock v. Barron Builders & Mgmt. Co., 523 F. Supp.2d 571, 572 (S.D.
Tex. 2007).
425. Id. at 574.
426. Id. at 575.
427. Id. (quoting Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871,
874 (5th Cir. 1999)).
428. Id. at 576-77.
429. See Combs v. Exxon Mobile Corp., No. 04-151-C, 2007 WL 3353504, at
*3 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2007).
430. Id.
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not sufficiently severe, pervasive, or physically threatening enough to
alter the conditions of employment.431 This both ratchets up the “severe
or pervasive” inquiry to “threatening” and ignores the Harris
reasonableness requirement.432 The court granted summary judgment
to the employer.433
3. Fifth Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today
A Fifth Circuit case, cited 637 times, that is more in tune with
what reasonable people and juries would likely find today is Harvill
v. Westward Communications.434 The plaintiff, Harvill, was the office
manager at a newspaper who alleged sexual harassment by Oscar
Rogers, who operated a commercial printing press at the newspaper’s
offices.435 The plaintiff alleged that Rogers had “grabbed her and
kissed her on the cheek, popped rubber bands at her breasts, fondled
her breasts ‘numerous times,’ patted her . . . buttocks ‘numerous
times,’ [had] c[o]me [up] behind her and rubbed his body against her”
and had “made comments . . . about her sex life and her abilities in
bed.”436 “Undoubtedly, the deliberate and unwanted touching of
Harvill’s intimate body parts [could] constitute severe sexual
harassment,” noted the court, rejecting the trial court’s finding that
Harvill’s allegations were “too conclusory” because she could not
name the precise number of times she had been touched, fondled, and
grabbed.437
This is a welcome contrast to Brooks v. City of San Mateo.438
“The Supreme Court,” continued the Fifth Circuit, “has stated that
isolated incidents, if egregious, can alter the terms and conditions of
employment.”439 The Harvill court corrected the district court’s
mistake of requiring that the harassing conduct alleged to be both
severe and pervasive, which is a clear misreading of Supreme Court
431. Id. at *3-4 (concluding that she did not sufficiently establish that the
conduct was unwelcome).
432. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1993).
433. See Combs, 2007 WL 3353504, at *6.
434. See generally Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, 433 F.3d 428 (5th Cir.
2005); see also supra note 86.
435. See id. at 435.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 436.
438. See generally Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000).
439. Harvill, 433 F.3d at 435 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 788 (1998)).
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precedent.440 The court also held that a reasonable jury might find the
conduct sufficiently pervasive, noting that “Harvill estimated that
Rogers touched her breasts or her buttocks perhaps as often as once a
week—although she later stated that it may not have been as often as
once a week.”441
The Harvill court also was clear about the role of the judge and
jury: “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Harvill, the
non-movant, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that
Rogers’[s] conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term
or condition of Harvill’s employment.”442
Harvill provides an important tool that judges in the Fifth Circuit
can use to forge a new path in cases that involve employees subjected
to unwanted sexual comments and behavior at work.
F. Conclusion
These five cases-in-chief are nineteen to twenty-four years old,
yet they have been very influential in ratcheting up the standards for
what constitutes a hostile work environment. This ratcheting-up effect
becomes particularly obvious when one sees how the sub-cases have
used the cases-in-chief to keep hostile environment cases away from
juries and substitute judges’ own opinions about what a reasonable
person would consider a hostile work environment. Each of the casesin-chief no longer reflects what most Americans believe today. Judges
should step out of the way and let the jury system do its work, updating
the law on sexual harassment in the light of the norm cascade
represented by #MeToo.
IV. THE “REASONABLENESS” OF NDAS THAT BAR SURVIVORS FROM
DISCLOSING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
As demonstrated in Parts II and III above, the norm cascade
prompted by #MeToo has fundamentally altered what’s reasonable
now in sexual harassment cases.443 New norms about what’s
reasonable also have implications for nondisclosure agreements

440.
441.
442.
443.
standard).

See id. at 43
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
See supra Parts II-III (discussing the norm cascade and reasonableness
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(NDAs) that affect whether plaintiffs can bring their claims forward.444
NDAs (or confidentiality agreements) are contractual agreements to
keep certain specified information secret.445 NDAs executed in the
employment context are enforceable only to the extent that they are
“reasonable”446 based on a weighing of factors discussed below.447 In
this Part, we propose a framework for evaluating the “reasonableness”
of sexual harassment NDAs, and we explain how the norm cascade
should influence courts’ analyses of whether they can be reasonably
enforced.
A. The “Reasonableness” Standard
It is a “bedrock” principle of contract law that a promise is
unenforceable if important public policy interests outweigh the
interest in enforcing the agreement.448 While the law generally permits
employers and employees to agree to contractual constraints on their
own speech,449 courts have recognized that restricting the free flow of
information in this way potentially implicates a number of public
policy concerns.450 Consequently, employment-related NDAs are
typically enforced only to the extent that they are “reasonable.”451
444. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d
732, 741 (1st Cir. 1996).
445. See NDA 101: What Is a Non-Disclosure Agreement?, ROCKET LAWYER,
https://www.rocketlawyer.com/article/nda-101:-what-is-a-non-disclosureagreement.rl [https://perma.cc/4WFD-SQZL] (last visited May 10, 2019).
446. See, e.g., CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, 306 F. Supp. 3d 857, 880 (S.D. W. Va.
2018) (holding a confidentiality agreement as void because it was unreasonable,
containing no limitation of time or geographic scope); Spirax Sarco, Inc. v. SSI Eng’g,
Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d 408, 425 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (requiring NDAs to be
“reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy”).
447. See, e.g., Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
448. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d at 744.
449. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991)
(discussing that private parties may voluntarily enter into an agreement to restrict their
own speech, and in doing so they waive their ability to assert First Amendment claims
against courts asked to enforce such agreements).
450. See, e.g., Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d. at 744.
451. Herrington, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 880 (holding a confidentiality agreement
as void because it was unreasonable, containing no limitation of time or geographic
scope). See Spirax Sarco, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d at 427 (requiring NDAs to be
“reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy”); PC Connection, Inc. v.
Price, 2015 WL 6554546, at *4 (D.N.H. Oct. 29, 2015) (applying the reasonableness
standard to an NDA and non-compete agreement, and holding that “[a] covenant is
unreasonable if it is (1) broader than needed to guard the employer’s legitimate
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There is “no mathematical formula” for ascertaining reasonableness.452
“Ultimately, the task of determining reasonableness is one of
balancing competing interests . . . . Each case must be determined on
its own particular facts . . . .”453 Factors courts commonly considered
in determining whether an NDA is “reasonable” include: the extent of

interests, (2) imposes an undue hardship on the employee; or (3) harms the public
interest” (citing Merrimack Valley Wood Prods. v. Near,
876 A.2d 757, 762 (N.H. 2005))); Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158,
174 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (requiring nondisclosure and noncompete agreements to be
reasonable in time and scope); AmeriGas Propane, L.P. v. T-Bo Propane, Inc., 972 F.
Supp. 685, 692 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (“In determining the enforceability of specific
nondisclosure clauses, courts must be satisfied with the reasonableness of the
clauses.”); see also Snepp v. U.S., 444 U.S. 507, 519 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that nondisclosure agreements “are enforceable only if they can survive
scrutiny under the ‘rule of reason’”); Henry Hope X-Ray Prods. v. Marron Carrel,
Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying the relevant state law that
nondisclosure agreements must be reasonable); Bodemer v. Swanel Beverage, Inc.,
884 F. Supp. 2d 717, 734 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (“[C]onfidentiality agreements ‘must be
reasonable with respect to the legitimate interests of the employer, restrictions on the
employee, and the public interest.’”); Prudential Ins. Co. Am. v. Baum, 629 F.Supp.
466, 468 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Tower Oil & Tech. Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060, 1065
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the reasonableness of a NDA depends on “whether
enforcement of the covenant will injure the public, whether enforcement will cause
undue hardship to the promisor and whether the restraint imposed by the covenant is
greater than is necessary to protect the interests of the employer”); Newinno, Inc. v.
Peregrim Dev., Inc., 2003 WL 21493838, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 3, 2003)
(holding that an NDA, like a non-compete agreement, is valid and enforceable only if
it is reasonable); Follmer, Rudzewics & Co. v. Kosco, 362 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Mich.
1984) (holding that courts must “scrutinize” an NDA to determine whether “it goes
beyond what is reasonably necessary for the protection of confidential
information . . . .”); 1st Am. Sys., Inc. v. Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 57 (S.D. 1981)
(holding that NDAs “are strictly construed and enforced only to the extent reasonably
necessary to protect the employer’s interest in confidential information”).
452. Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 521 (S.D.
1996); accord Ellis v. James V. Hurson Assocs., 565 A.2d 615, 618 (D.C. 1989)
(“[T]he court adopted the Restatement’s approach that reasonableness was
determined by balancing the employer’s need to protect a legitimate interest with the
hardship to the employee and injury to the public.”).
453. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d at 521.
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the restraint,454 the employer’s interest in maintaining secrecy,455 the
employee’s interest in disclosure,456 and the public’s interest in
disclosure.457
The flexibility and factual sensitivity of the “reasonableness”
test is well suited to address the different, commonly used types of
sexual harassment NDAs and the different contexts in which they are
adopted and invoked to prevent disclosures.458 NDAs differ along three
key dimensions: (1) their breadth of coverage;459 (2) the extent to
which they are adopted voluntarily;460 and (3) the legal context in
which they are adopted.461 First, NDAs differ in their breadth or
454. See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Tr. & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556,
563 (4th Cir. 1990) (considering whether constraint is “no broader than is necessary”
to protect the employer); Layne Christensen Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., 836 F.Supp.2d
1203, 1223 (D. Kan. 2011) (considering geographic restrictions on NDAs); Shepherd
v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 25 A.3d 1233, 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011)
(considering duration and geographic restrictions on NDAs); Equifax Servs., Inc. v.
Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 488, 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
(considering geographic restrictions on NDAs); Prudential Ins., 629 F.Supp. at 471
(finding that a non-disclosure agreement was overbroad).
455. See Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1244 (considering employer’s need for
protection from covered disclosures); Tower Oil & Tech. Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d
1060, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (considering the employer’s need for an NDA).
456. See, e.g., Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1247 (considering impact of NDA on
employee’s ability to earn a living); Eden Hannon, 914 F.2d at 563 (considering
whether restraint is “unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the legitimate efforts
of th[e] [promisor] to conduct its business”); Buckley, 425 N.E.2d at 1065
(considering whether the NDA will cause “undue hardship” on the
employee/promisor).
457. See, e.g., Shepherd, 25 A.3d 1233, 1233 (holding that the employee
would suffer if the agreement is enforced); Eden Hannon, 914 F.2d at 563
(considering whether the restraint is “reasonable from the standpoint of sound public
policy”); Buckley, 425 N.E.2d at 1065 (considering whether enforcement of the NDA
“will injure the public”).
458. See supra notes 448-457 and accompanying text (discussing the
flexibility of the “reasonableness” standard).
459. See generally Maxwell S. Kennerly, Sexual Harassment and the
Enforcement of Non-Disclosure Agreements, LITIG. & TRIAL BLOG (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.litigationandtrial.com/2018/01/articles/attorney/sexual-harassment-nda/
[https://perma.cc/LRR7-RSC5].
460. See Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the
Culture of Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure
Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2524-25 (2018) (discussing
that voluntariness is a limited concept with various limitations).
461. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, Blame Nondisparagment Clauses,
Not Settlements for Concealing the Most Sexual Misconduct, MARKET WATCH (Dec.
6, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/blame-nondisparagement-clauses-notsettlements-for-concealing-the-most-sexual-misconduct-2017-12-06
[https://perma.cc/JG4G-KF34 ] (reporting that non-disparagement agreements—not
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specificity of coverage.462 For instance, some employers require
employees to sign broad anti-disparagement NDAs that do not
mention sexual harassment explicitly but forbid employees from
making any statement that could harm the employer’s reputation.463
Some have interpreted such anti-disparagement NDAs to encompass
disclosures about sexual harassment.464 Indeed, this was long the
position of the Weinstein Company, which forced employees to sign
broad anti-disparagement agreements and used them for many years
to silence Harvey Weinstein’s accusers.465 By contrast, some NDAs
are more narrowly tailored to forbid disclosures about specific
instances of harassment.466 Such distinctions may bear on their
reasonableness.467
Second, NDAs vary in the extent to which they are adopted
voluntarily by the signing employee.468 Some are negotiated explicitly
between the employer and the signing employee, while others are
imposed by the employer as a condition of employment or a condition
of resolving any sexual harassment claim.469 As a general matter,
employees negotiating explicitly for confidentiality terms are likely to
have more power and agency than those on whom terms are imposed
as a condition of employment.470 However, negotiating employees
differ radically in their income, education, and job security, all of
which affect their ability to bargain meaningfully for silence about
settlement agreements—were the greatest impediment to revealing sexual harassment
by Weinstein).
462. See Kennerly, supra note 459.
463. See id. (reporting that the Weinstein Company required employees to
sign broad waivers forbidding critical comments that could damage the company’s
“business reputation”).
464. See id.
465. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, Blame Nondisparagment Clauses,
Not Settlements for Concealing the Most Sexual Misconduct, MARKETWATCH, (Dec.
6, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/blame-nondisparagement-clauses-notsettlements-for-concealing-the-most-sexual-misconduct-2017-12-06
https://perma.cc/M7X5-U63E (reporting that non-disparagement agreements—not
settlement agreements—were the greatest impediment to revealing sexual harassment
by Weinstein).
466. See generally id. (explaining that some non-disparagement clauses may
be narrow).
467. See id. (stating that the specificity of a non-disparagement agreement
turns on its reasonableness).
468. See Prasad, supra note 460, at 2524-25 (discussing that voluntariness is
a limited concept with various limitations).
469. See id. at 2521.
470. See id. (noting the unequal power dynamic between an employee and
potential employee in the context of an NDA).
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sexual harassment. Such distinctions may be relevant to their
reasonableness.471
Third, NDAs are adopted against different legal backdrops.472
Some are adopted to resolve pending or threatened litigation, while
others are adopted outside the litigation context to resolve sexual
harassment complaints raised informally through an employer’s
internal channels.473 Whether an NDA is reasonable may depend, in
part, on what it contains and how it was adopted.
In addition, the reasonableness of enforcing a particular NDA
might also depend on the context in which a potentially covered
disclosure occurs. For instance, existing case law treats disclosures
made to a court or regulatory agency differently than disclosures made
to the general public outside these legal fora.474 Below we outline the
legal framework for evaluating the “reasonableness” of NDAs and
discuss how it is likely to apply in cases where employers attempt to
use them to prevent public disclosures by survivors of sexual
harassment.
B. NDAs that Forbid Disclosure in Court or to Regulators Are Not
Reasonable
In the context of legal proceedings, courts have definitively
struck the “reasonableness” balance to allow disclosures of sexual
harassment that would otherwise be covered by an NDA.475 Case law
clearly establishes that NDAs cannot be enforced to bar individuals
from disclosing information about harassment in judicial proceedings
or to regulators at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).476 Longstanding common law doctrine holds that agreements
to suppress evidence in judicial proceedings are void as contrary to

471. See Tippett, supra note 461.
472. See id. (discussing how some NDAs are entered while litigation is
ongoing and some are entered into as a common place procedure in the workplace).
473. See id.
474. See infra Section IV.B (discussing that NDA’s cannot be enforced to bar
individuals from disclosing information about harassment in judicial proceedings or
to regulators at the EEOC).
475. See, e.g., Kennerly, supra note 459 (stating that NDAs that prohibit
disclosure of sexual harassment have been found to violate federal law).
476. See Matthew Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: How Lawyers Kept a Lid on
Sexual Harassment Claims, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017) (“NDAs cannot lawfully
prevent people from reporting claims to law enforcement and government agencies,
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the US.”).
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public policy.477 Consistent with this principle, courts have held that an
NDA cannot be enforced to prevent individuals from providing
evidence about sexual harassment in judicial proceedings.478 As one
court explained, evidence about prior sexual harassment claims settled
by an employer is “highly relevant” to resolving hostile environment
claims, since hostile environment plaintiffs must establish the severity
or pervasiveness of the conduct and the employer’s knowledge and
handling of it.479 Public policy strongly favors allowing such probative
evidence into judicial proceedings.480 In weighing competing interests,
the court opined that the “plaintiff’s interest in being free from
unlawful discrimination in the workplace, coupled with the public’s
interest in the eradication of discrimination, outweighs [the
employer’s] interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
the . . . settlement agreement.”481
Another court that allowed testimony of prior sexual harassment
in spite of an NDA prohibiting it observed that the public’s “concern
grows more pressing as additional individuals are harmed by identical
or similar action.”482 In light of these concerns, courts have concluded
that enforcing sexual harassment NDAs in the context of judicial
477. See, e.g., Harris v. Gulf Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1226 (N.D. Ca.
2003) (“Agreements to suppress evidence have been held void as against public
policy.” (quoting Williamson v. Super. Ct., 582 P.2d 126, 131 (Cal. 1978))).
478. See Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 365 (D. Nev. 1993) (refusing
to enforce an NDA to prevent previous victims of sexual harassment at defendant
company from providing evidence in current sexual harassment lawsuit because it
“would condone the practice of ‘buy[ing] the silence of a witness with a settlement
agreement’”); Denise Rich Songs, Inc. v. Hester, 2004 WL 2563702, at *5 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 4, 2004) (finding that employer had no cause of action for breach of a
confidentiality agreement by a former employee who had disclosed information in
violation of that agreement in connection with an employment discrimination
lawsuit); Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732, 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2002) (refusing to enforce an NDA to prevent previous victims of sexual harassment
at defendant company from providing evidence in current sexual harassment lawsuit);
Farmers Group, Inc. v. Lee, 28 P.3d 413, 419 (Kan. App. 2001) (refusing to enforce
an NDA signed by a former employee to settle an employment discrimination claim
in a subsequent case, allowing the former employee to present “nonconfidential,
truthful information . . . in connection with a claim against his former employer”). See
also Waterson v. Plank Road Motel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 284, 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)
(allowing testimony by a former employee who settled a harassment complaint against
the same employer because the probative value of the testimony outweighed the
employer’s interest in secrecy).
479. Llerena, 845 A.2d at 739.
480. See id. (stating that the judiciary’s role includes preventing exclusion of
probative evidence in the interest of discovering the truth).
481. Id. at 739.
482. Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 366.
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proceedings would “undermine[] not only individual third-party
plaintiffs’ ability to vindicate their rights but the judicial system
itself.”483 Consequently, they have consistently ordered that plaintiffs
be provided with information about prior instances of sexual
harassment at the defendant company, even when such instances are
covered by NDAs.484
Courts similarly have held that NDAs cannot be enforced to bar
the provision of information about sexual harassment to the EEOC in
the context of an investigation.485 In EEOC v. Astra USA, the court
explained that Congress had statutorily commanded the EEOC “to
vindicate the public interest in preventing employment
discrimination” and allowing employers to prohibit communications
with the agency would hobble its ability to investigate discrimination
complaints and harm the public interest.486 The court rejected the
employer’s argument that the strong public policy interest in
settlement supported the full enforcement of settlement agreements,
including non-disclosure terms.487 The court found this interest
insignificant when weighed against “public policy [that] so clearly
favors the free flow of information between victims of harassment and
the agency entrusted with righting the wrongs inflicted upon them.”488
Accordingly, the court held that employees who had signed NDAs
with the employer being investigated could nonetheless respond to
questions from EEOC investigators and volunteer information
concerning sexual harassment at their employer to the EEOC.489

483. Lee, 28 P.3d at 420.
484. See Meena Yoo, SEC Disclosures: Balancing Investor Rights with
Privacy Rights, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (May 7, 2018),
https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/05/07/sec-disclosures-balancing-investorrights-with-privacy-rights/#_edn6 [https://perma.cc/V6MY-GMPX] (stating that
courts have generally found that companies have an affirmative duty to disclose
sexual harassment allegations).
485. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d
738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating the Congress’s investigatory powers would be
seriously curtailed if victims of sexual harassment cannot approach the EEOC). In
another context, a federal district court suggested that there is a constitutional right to
inform the government of violations of federal laws, and that under the Supremacy
Clause, U.S. Constitution Art. VI, this right supersedes local tort or contract rights.
See Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 415 (D.D.C. 1994).
486. Astra USA, Inc. at 744 (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980)).
487. See id. at 745.
488. Id.
489. See id.
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While the existing case law holding NDAs unenforceable in
judicial and regulatory fora covers many of the disclosures likely to be
made by survivors who sign sexual harassment-related NDAs, other
types of disclosures do not fit squarely within this case law. For a
variety of reasons, many survivors choose not to pursue legal action.490
Sexual harassment lawsuits are costly, lengthy, uncertain, and
emotionally grueling for plaintiffs.491 There is a pervasive sense that
“the law often fails to prevent and correct sexual harassment.”492
Indeed, the revelations of #MeToo suggest that a generation of sexual
harassment lawsuits failed to produce meaningful social change in
workplace norms and behaviors. Thus, many survivors may look to
channels outside of formal legal institutions to air grievances,
including friends and family, “whisper networks” of other survivors
and potential targets of harassment, social media, conventional media,
or other public fora.493
Case law on disclosures to courts and regulators does not
squarely address these kinds of public disclosures. Public disclosures
differ from disclosures before judicial and administrative bodies in
important ways. Disclosures made outside of legal institutions do not
implicate the fundamental fairness and integrity of those institutions,
nor can they be shielded from widespread public dissemination by
protective orders guarding parties and third parties from unnecessary
publicity and embarrassment, as often occurs in legal proceedings.494
While these distinctions suggest that case law on legal disclosures
cannot be applied directly to extralegal public disclosures, Section C
below explains that they do not necessarily tip the balance in favor of
enforcing sexual harassment NDAs against survivors who wish to
490. See, e.g., Annie Hill, Nondisclosure Agreements: Sexual Harassment and
the Contract of Silence, GENDER POL’Y REP. (Nov. 14, 2017),
http://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/nondisclosure-agreements-sexual-harassmentand-the-contract-of-silence/ [https://perma.cc/J96A-YL8L] (noting that NDAs may,
in some instances, help survivors of sexual harassment).
491. See id.
492. Id.
493. See Hill, supra note 490.
494. See, e.g., Dunn v. Warhol, No. 91-4169, 1992 WL 102744, at *1-2 (E.D.
Pa. May 8, 1992) (holding that the plaintiff had “articulated persuasive reasons why
the dissemination of this highly personal information could cause not only serious
embarrassment but also severe emotional damage to her and her family” thereby
justifying a protective order); Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732, 739 (N.J.
Super. Law Div. 2002) (refusing to enforce NDA to prevent employee who had settled
a harassment claim from providing testimony for plaintiff in a harassment suit against
their mutual employer but granting a protective order to protect the testifying
employee’s privacy).
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speak.495 Instead, courts must inquire into the reasonableness of
enforcing sexual harassment NDAs to prevent extra-legal disclosures
on a case-by-case basis.
C. A Framework for Evaluating the Reasonableness of NDAs to
Forbid Extralegal Disclosures of Sexual Harassment
As laid out above, the reasonableness of an employment-related
NDA depends on a balancing of factors, including: the extent of the
restraint,496 the employer’s interest in maintaining secrecy,497 the
employee’s interest in disclosure,498 and the public’s interest in
disclosure.499 To our knowledge, no existing case has applied this
framework to a sexual harassment NDA. Drawing on case law in
analogous contexts, this Section discusses how each factor should be
analyzed to determine the reasonableness of sexual harassment
NDAs.500 Based on a balancing of the relevant interests, we argue that
NDAs generally should not be enforced to silence survivors who wish
to publicly discuss their harassment outside of legal proceedings.
However, we acknowledge that there are legitimate countervailing
495. See infra Section IV.C (explaining that courts have been using a
balancing approach to enforcing NDAs by looking at factors such as the interests of
the employer, employee, and the general public).
496. See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d
556, 563 (4th Cir. 1990) (considering whether constraint is “no broader than is
necessary” to protect the employer); Layne Christensen Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., 836
F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1231 (D. Kan. 2011); Prudential Ins. V. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466,
471 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding that an NDA was overbroad and unenforceable);
Shepherd v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 25 A.3d 1233, 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011)
(considering duration and geographic restrictions in determining reasonableness of an
NDA); Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 488, 491
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
497. See, e.g., Tower Oil & Tech. Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981); Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1244 (considering employer’s need for
protection from covered disclosures).
498. See, e.g., Eden Hannon & Co., 914 F.2d at 563 (considering whether
restraint is “unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the legitimate efforts of th[e]
[promisor] to conduct its business”); Tower Oil, 425 N.E.2d at 1065 (considering
whether the NDA will cause “undue hardship” on the employee/promisor); Shepherd,
25 A.3d at 1247 (considering impact of NDA on employee’s ability to earn a living).
499. See, e.g., Eden Hannon & Co., 914 F.2d at 563 (considering whether the
restraint is “reasonable from the standpoint of sound public policy”); Tower Oil &
Tech. Co., 425 N.E.2d at 1065 (considering whether enforcement of the NDA “will
injure the public”); Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1247.
500. See infra Section IV.C (discussing the extent of restraint, interests of the
employer in protecting business secrets, interests of the discloser, and interests of the
general public).
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interests that should be taken into account, including the interests that
many survivors have in confidentiality. We argue that the
“reasonableness” test provides courts with the flexibility to
accommodate competing interests and to adapt to changed
circumstances over time as the law and the facts on the ground develop
in this nascent area.
1. Extent of Restraint
Courts do not favor enforcing broad, undifferentiated restrictions
contained in NDAs, confidentiality agreements, or restraints on trade
more generally.501 The general rule is that “covenants that are
functionally overbroad are unreasonable and void as a matter of
law.”502 Courts typically require NDAs to identify with specificity the
type of information the employee may not disclose.503 Courts will
refuse to enforce overbroad NDAs or will narrowly tailor such
covenants if they choose to enforce them.504 For instance, courts have
refused to enforce a non-solicitation clause that contained “no
additional limiting language or circumstances in the case that
otherwise would limit the scope of the restriction.”505 Courts also
commonly read temporal or geographic limitations into agreements
lacking them.506 This standard of narrow tailoring should bar the use
501. See, e.g., AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987)
(recognizing that broad confidentiality agreements constitute unreasonable restraints
on trade), superseded by statute, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/8 (1999); Prudential Ins.
Co. Am. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 471 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (“Nondisclosure covenants
adjudged overbroad are considered an unfair restraint upon competition.”); SI
Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (“[A]ny
agreement which seeks to restrict post-employment activities is subject to the same
standards [as noncompetition clauses].”); Whelan Security Co. v. Kennebrew, 379
S.W.3d 835, 843 (Mo. 2012) (citing the proposition that restrictive covenants must be
narrowly tailored to be enforceable); Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 679 P.2d 206,
211 (Kan. 1984) (stating that enforcement of a nondisclosure agreement “would
unreasonably infringe upon appellant’s right to earn a living”).
502. Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Kanas, 871 F. Supp. 2d 520, 535 (E.D. Va.
2012) (reviewing a Separation Agreement for ambiguity to determine if it was
overbroad).
503. See id.
504. See Concord Orthopaedics Prof’l Ass’n v. Forbes, 702 A.2d 1273, 1276
(N.H. 1997) (citing the principle that courts will narrowly tailor covenants not to
compete by geographic scope, duration, and regarding only legitimate employer
interests).
505. Whelan Security, 379 S.W.3d at 843 (finding the non-solicitation clause
unenforceable because it was “unreasonably overbroad”).
506. See Concord Orthopaedics, 702, A.2d at 1276.
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of broad anti-disparagement NDAs that do not contain scope
restrictions of any kind against sexual harassment survivors who wish
to speak.
2. Employer Interests
The speech restrictions contained in an employment-related
NDA are enforceable only to the extent “reasonably necessary for the
protection of the employer.”507 An employer cannot simply assert a
bald preference for secrecy but rather must assert a “legitimate and
substantial business justification” for the speech restriction.508 “[I]n
cases where the employer’s interests do not rise to the level of a
proprietary interest deserving of judicial protection, a court will
conclude that a restrictive agreement merely stifles competition and
therefore is unenforceable.”509 Traditionally, courts have found
employers’ interests in protecting trade secrets to provide the highest
and plainest justification for confidentiality,510 although even these
core interests are not absolute and remain subject to a balance of other

507. Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1244; see also PharMethod, Inc. v. Caserta, 382
Fed. App’x. 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A restrictive covenant is reasonably necessary
for the protection of the employer when it is narrowly tailored to protect an employer’s
legitimate interests.”); HR Staffing Consultants, LLC v. Butts, No. 2:15-3155, 2015
WL 3492609, at *12 (D.N.J. June 2, 2015), aff’d, 627 F. App’x 168 (3d Cir. 2015)
(holding that a non-compete limiting the defendant’s ability to work in five New
Jersey counties only for a period of one year was narrowly tailored to ensure the
covenant is no broader than necessary to protect the employer’s interests); Campbell
Soup Co. v. Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d 477, 488-89 (D.N.J. 1999) (“Under New Jersey
law, . . . [t]o minimize the hardship imposed on the employee, the geographic,
temporal and subject-matter restrictions of an otherwise enforceable agreement not to
compete will be enforced only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the
employer’s legitimate business interests.”) (citations omitted).
508. Banner Health Sys. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 851 F.3d 35, 41 (D.C.
Cir. 2017); accord Ellis v. James V. Hurson Assocs., 565 A.2d 615, 618 (D.C. 1989)
(employer must assert a “legitimate interest”).
509. Ingersoll–Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 892, 894 (N.J. 1988)
(finding that since “[t]he line between [protectable] information, trade secrets, and the
general skills and knowledge of a highly sophisticated employee will be very difficult
to draw,” courts are expected to “narrowly” construe an employer’s need for
protection); see also GPS Indus., LLC v. Lewis, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1333 (M.D.
Fla. 2010) (citing FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(h) (2019) (indicating that Florida courts
“construe a restrictive covenant narrowly, against the restraint or against the drafter
where legitimate business interests have been established”).
510. See generally Bodemer v. Swanel Beverage, 884 F. Supp. 2d 717 (N.D.
Ind. 2012).
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interests.511 Courts also give solicitude to employer interests in the
secrecy of confidential business information—for instance, customer
lists or business strategy—that may not qualify for trade secret
protection.512
These core interests do not necessarily exhaust the universe of
protectable interests.513 Courts will look to the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the individual case to assess the legitimacy of the
employer’s asserted interest.514 Such ad hoc analysis has not yielded
clear rules or bright lines around what constitutes a protected employer
interest. However, the logic of the existing case law suggests that
employment-related NDAs can be used to protect only the employer’s
legitimate business interests.515
The term “business interest” is not well defined in the case law,
but the legitimacy of a “business interest” in secrecy often turns on
whether the disclosure of covered information would cause the
employer “competitive harm.”516 The prospect of competitive harm is
clearly present when an employee threatens to provide a competitor
with confidential information about the employer’s business strategy,
511. See Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv. Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978)
512. See, e.g., Overholt Crop. Ins. Serv. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1361
(8th Cir. 1991); Roto-Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (W.D. Va. 1995)
(recognizing that information such as customer lists, marketing information, and
product development information, “if disclosed to competitors, would destroy a
company’s ability to compete”); see also Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667
A.2d 729, 734 (Pa. Super. 1995) (including “corporate information such as overhead
costs, profit margin, dealer discounts, customer pricing, marketing strategy and
customer contract terms” in category of non-trade secret information); Bell Fuel Corp.
v. Cattolico, 544 A.2d 450, 460-61 (Pa. Super. 1988) (discussing customer
information); Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 150 (Ga.
1973); Jodi L. Short, Killing the Messenger: The Use of Nondisclosure Agreements to
Silence Whistleblowers, 60 PITT. L. REV. 1207, 1229 (1999).
513. See, e.g., Cronimet Holdings, Inc. v. Keywell Metals, LLC, 73 F. Supp.
3d 907, 915-16 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
514. See, e.g., id.; Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 396
(Ill. 2011). Additionally, many courts will not enforce nondisclosure clauses that
contain no time limitation. See McGough v. Nalco Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 756
(N.D. W. Va. 2007); see also Prudential Ins. Co. Am. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 471
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (“[T]he absence of any restriction upon the duration of the
nondisclosure provision renders it unenforceable.”); Howard Schultz & Assoc. of the
Se., Inc. v. Broniec, 236 S.E.2d 265, 265 (Ga. 1977); Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 218
S.E.2d 68, 68 (Ga. 1975) (holding that contracts limiting the disclosure of
“confidential” information in perpetuity are unenforceable).
515. See Short, supra note 512, at 1212.
516. Id. at 1229.
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products, or customers.517 By contrast, courts have declined to enforce
NDAs where there was no evidence that disclosure of the covered
information would harm the employer’s competitive position.518 For
instance, courts found NDAs unenforceable where the employer
sought to protect the stability of its own workforce without respect to
its competitors.519 The threatened disclosure need not be made to a
517. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Morin, 731 S.E.2d 288, 295 (N.C. 2012);
Shepherd v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 25 A.3d 1233, 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2011) (holding that legitimate business interests that are protectable under a
confidentiality agreement include “trade secrets and confidential information”); see
also Roto-Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (W.D. Va. 1995) (recognizing
that information about customer lists, marketing, and product development “if
disclosed to competitors, would destroy a company’s ability to compete”); Roberson
v. C.P. Allen Const. Co., 50 So. 3d 471, 475 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (holding that an
employer enjoys a protectable interest if the employee was privy to confidential
information, secret lists, or developed close relationship with clients; additionally,
employer’s investment in the employee can also constitute protectable interest);
ACAS Acquisitions (Precitech) Inc. v. Hobert, 923 A.2d 1076, 1084–85 (N.H. 2007)
(“Legitimate interests of an employer that may be protected from competition include:
the employer’s trade secrets[;] . . . confidential information other than trade
secrets . . . such as information regarding a unique business method; an employee’s
special influence over the employer’s customers[;] . . . contacts developed during the
employment; and the employer’s development of goodwill and a positive image.”).
518. See, e.g., Slijepcevich v. Caremark, Inc., No. 95C7286, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 110, at *4 (N.D. Ill Jan. 4, 1996) (“[C]ourts will enjoin former employees only
when there is a threat that they will disclose secret information to a competitor.”);
Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (noting that the employer did not lose any business due to disclosures and
considering this as a factor militating against enforcement of the nondisclosure
agreement); Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 149 (Ga. 1973)
(“Covenants not to disclose and utilize confidential business information are related
to general covenants not to compete because of the similar employer interest in
maintaining competitive advantage.”).
519. See, e.g., GPS Indus., LLC v. Lewis, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1334 (M.D.
Fla. 2010) (holding the company did not have a legitimate business interest in
protecting from use or disclosure all prospective or existing customers globally, nor
was it able to protect all information obtained in employment); Prudential Ins. Co.
Am. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 472 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding a nondisclosure
covenant applicable to “any information whatsoever pertaining to contractholders or
[plaintiff’s] products” as unenforceable because the information protected did not fall
under the plaintiff’s legitimate business interests); see also Carlson Grp., Inc. v.
Davenport, No. 16-CV-10520, 2016 WL 7212522, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2016)
(holding that a confidentiality clause protecting all information of or concerning its
business was unenforceable as not protecting a legitimate business interest); Trailer
Leasing Co. v. Assocs. Commercial Corp., No. 96 C 2305, 1996 WL 392135, at *3
(N.D. Ill. July 10, 1996) (holding that “[s]ince TLC cannot possibly have a nearpermanent relationship with a prospective customer,” the confidentiality agreement
covering all prospective customers does not address a legitimate business interest and
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competitor in order to constitute competitive harm.520 However, courts
enforcing NDAs based on the employer’s interest in secrecy have
tended to do so when the employer can show that non-enforcement
would place it “in imminent peril of suffering significant competitive
losses.”521 Information about sexual harassment in the employer’s
workplace does not typically harm the employer’s ability to compete
effectively with other companies.
Rather, the harm presented by disclosures about harassment is
more in the nature of reputational harm or embarrassment. Case law
explicitly addressing NDAs has not squarely addressed whether
protection against such harms could constitute a “legitimate business
interest.” But cases assessing the salience of such harms in other
contexts are instructive and suggest that the bar is very high for these
types of claims. Case law on the applicability of the confidential
business information exemption from disclosure under the federal
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has stressed that mere
“embarrassment does not rise to the level of substantial competitive
harm of the type recognized by the courts” as necessary to abrogate
FOIA’s disclosure requirements.522 This is true even if the employer
can show that the embarrassment attendant to the disclosure of secret
information is anticipated to be “so severe that it could indirectly harm
the company’s bottom line.”523 Case law on protective orders similarly
suggests that “where embarrassment is the chief concern, the
is unenforceable); R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Fagan, 767 F. Supp. 1259, 1268
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding plaintiff’s noncompete and nondisclosure covenants were
unenforceable because plaintiff did not prove that it enjoyed near-permanent customer
relationships with its clients and thus did not have protectable, legitimate business
interest justifying broad restraint on senior executive’s employment);
AssuredPartners, Inc. v. Schmitt, 44 N.E.3d 463, 475-76 (Ill. App. Dist. 2015)
(holding a provision that sought to protect “virtually every fact, plan, proposal, data,
and opinion that [the employee] became aware of during the time he was employed,”
regardless of whether it was in any way proprietary or confidential in nature as
unenforceable); Schmersahl, Treloar & Co., P.C. v. McHugh, 28 S.W.3d 345, 348
(Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
520. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 856 F. Supp. 348, 349 (E.D.
Mich. 1994), aff’d, 97 F.3d 1452, No. 95-1130, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25322 (6th
Cir. Sept. 12, 1996).
521. Uniroyal, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25322 at *2.
522. United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 601 F.3d 557, 562 (D.C.
Cir. 2010). See also Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1998 WL
83976, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1998) (holding that the confidential information
covered by the agreement included presumptively public information and the parties
reached the agreement to avoid embarrassment. Therefore, the agreement was
invalid).
523. Short, supra note 512, at 1232.
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embarrassment must be ‘particularly serious’ to suffice.”524 In this
context—where “embarrassment”525 is an explicit ground for granting
a protective order—the asserted harm of disclosure cannot be merely
reputational but rather must affect the “competitive and financial
position” of the firm.526 It will be difficult for employers to establish
this type of interest in preventing disclosures about sexual
harassment.527
3. Discloser Interests
The reasonableness of a disclosure restriction also depends on
the strength of the discloser’s interest in revealing the contested
information. Even if the employer can articulate a legitimate business
interest in secrecy, the speech restrictions in an NDA cannot be “so
large as to . . . impose undue hardship on the [employee].”528 Survivors
who wish to disclose their harassment have strong psychological and
health interests in doing so.529 As catalogued below, there are many
psychological and physical harms associated with sexual
harassment.530 Mental health professionals caution that keeping the
experience of harassment secret is “literally toxic to [one’s] health”
because timely treatment and care is essential for mitigating harm.531
Survivors also have economic interests in disclosure that are
analogous to the interests that other employees have in escaping more
traditional employment-related NDAs barring the disclosure of trade
secrets or confidential business information. Courts long have
recognized that such speech restrictions can constrain an employee’s
524. Glickstein, 1998 WL 83976 at *3 (refusing to grant a protective order for
medical and financial materials produced in sexual harassment litigation to prevent
embarrassment).
525. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
526. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).
527. Employers may have a stronger interest in protecting the confidentiality
of settlement terms in NDAs resolving sexual harassment claims than in protecting
the underlying facts surrounding the harassment, because the employers’ generosity
relative to its competitors could arguably place it at a competitive disadvantage.
528. Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv. Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978), accord OVRS Acquisition Corp. v. Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 657 N.E.2d
117, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Mountain Comprehensive Health Corp. v. Gibson, No.
2013-CA-000373-MR, 2015 WL 1194508, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2015).
529. Nicole Spector, The Hidden Health Effects of Sexual Harassment, NBC:
BETTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/hiddenhealth-effects-sexual-harassment-ncna810416 [https://perma.cc/5EX9-WHH3].
530. See id.
531. Id.
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ability to obtain and function successfully in a new job in their field.532
For instance, it would be impossible for an automotive engineer to
change jobs within the industry if he or she is forbidden from
discussing any and all automotive production processes.
Consequently, many courts have characterized employment-related
NDAs as restraints on trade viewed with disfavor at common law
much like covenants not to compete, and they have narrowed or
abrogated them in order to allow employees to pursue employment
opportunities.533
To be sure, harassment NDAs do not restrain trade in the same
way as traditional NDAs protecting technical or confidential business
information. Nonetheless, the principle underlying the nonharassment cases—that employees should not be inhibited from
earning a living in their chosen profession—favors non-enforcement
in cases involving sexual harassment disclosures as well. Workplace
sexual harassment is an experience that profoundly impacts survivors’
professional lives, and forced silence about that experience can
similarly impair survivors’ future employment prospects.534 “[T]he
feelings of shame or guilt that a person may feel when sexually
harassed at work can devastate their self-esteem and sense of self532. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 2 § 186(1) (AM.
LAW INST. 1981)
533. See id. (“A promise is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is
unreasonably in restraint of trade.”); see also PC Connection, Inc. v. Price, No. 15cv-208-PB, 2015 WL 6554546, at *4 (D.N.H. Oct. 29, 2015) (applying the same
reasonableness standard to an NDA and non-compete agreements); Bodemer v.
Swanel Beverage, 884 F. Supp. 2d 717, 733 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (predicting that the
Indiana Supreme Court would analyze a confidentiality agreement like a covenant not
to compete); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Whitacre, 60 F. Supp. 2d 819, 825 (C.D.
Ill.
1999)
(holding
that
under
Illinois
law,
noncompetition
and nondisclosure agreements are considered restrictive covenants, and therefore
operate at least as partial restraints of trade requiring careful scrutiny by courts); Cent.
Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 521 (S.D. 1996) (equating NDAs
with covenants not to compete and applying the American Jurisprudence standard of
reasonableness for covenants to compete to an NDA). Many courts similarly find that
confidentiality clauses or NDAs operate as noncompete agreements. See, e.g., Fay v.
Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 799 S.E.2d 318, 323 (Ct. App. 2017), reh’g
denied, (May 26, 2017), cert. granted, (Feb. 1, 2018) (holding a nondisclosure
agreement to be so overbroad as to be considered a noncompete agreement).
534. See Hill, supra note 490; Jennifer Berdahl & Jana Raver, Sexual
Harassment, in APA HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY,
VOL. 3: MAINTAINING, EXPANDING, AND CONTRACTING THE ORGANIZATION 641
(Sheldon Zedeck ed., 2011); see generally Afroditi Pina & Theresa A. Gannon, An
Overview of the Literature on Antecedents, Perceptions and Behavioural
Consequences of Sexual Harassment, 18 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 209 (2010).
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worth as a professional.”535 Harassment may make the target doubt his
or her own abilities or wonder if he or she was hired solely for sexual
reasons.536 Survivors who are young or new to a field might wonder if
this is just the way things are and if they will have to learn to live with
the harassment if they wish to continue their employment.537 “If they
have nothing to compare it to, they may not have an idea of what is
normal . . . .”538 Forced silence normalizes harassment and may lead
victims to believe that they must leave the workplace or their chosen
field to escape it.539 This inhibits their ability to earn a living and
restrains trade in violation of well-established public policy interests.
Taken together, survivors’ interests in disclosure should weigh heavily
in the “reasonableness” balance.
4. Public Interests
Courts have recognized that in many contexts secrecy implicates
the public interest as well as the interests of the contracting parties.540
Thus, courts have admonished that, in addition to balancing the
parties’ interests, courts should ensure that NDA restrictions are not
“so large as to interfere with the public interests.”541 Courts have found
that the public has interests in: employees’ ability to find work in their
chosen field;542 the free flow of information in markets;543 integrity in

535. Spector, supra note 529.
536. See id.
537. See id.
538. Id.
539. See id.
540. See, e.g., Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv. Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
541. Id. at 315. See Mountain Comprehensive Health Corp. v. Gibson, No.
2013–CA–000373–MR, 2015 WL 1194508, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2015);
OVRS Acquisition Corp. v. Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 657 N.E.2d 117, 126 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995). Some courts have looked to whether or not the breadth of the restriction
is harmful to the public good. See Concord Orthopaedics Prof’l Ass’n v. Forbes, 702
A.2d 1273, 1276 (N.H. 1997) (holding that referring physicians are not “actual
clients” within the meaning of a non-compete and to hold as such would “not foster
the public good”).
542. See Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 521 (S.D.
1996).
543. See DONALD J. ASPELUND & JOAN E. BECKNEW, EMPLOYEE
NONCOMPETITION LAW § 2.1 (2018).
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corporate governance;544 exposing illegal activity;545 revelations
implicating public health and safety;546 and a discrimination-free
workplace.547 Disclosures of sexual harassment advance all of these
interests. This Subsection focuses on the interests in exposing illegal
activity and protecting public health and safety, arguing that these
interests should inform decisions about the reasonableness of sexual
harassment NDAs.548
Courts have been dubious of employer attempts to conceal
illegality via NDAs.549 Sexual harassment is illegal. As such, courts
should be wary of employer attempts to conceal it against the wishes
of survivors. In litigation over the tobacco company Brown &
Williamson’s attempt to recover incriminating documents that were
allegedly stolen from it by a former paralegal, the court explained the
perverse incentives that would be created if employers were allowed
to contract to conceal their illegal behavior:
If the B&W strategy were accepted, those seeking to bury their unlawful or
potentially unlawful acts from consumers, from other members of the
public, and from law enforcement or regulatory authorities could achieve
that objective by a simple yet ingenious strategy: all that would need to be
done would be to delay or confuse any charges of health hazard, fraud,
corruption, . . . or other misdeeds, by focusing instead on inconvenient
documentary evidence and labelling it as the product of . . . interference
with contracts . . . . The result would be that even the most severe public
health and safety dangers would be subordinated . . . in the public mind to
the malefactors’ . . . contract claims, real or fictitious.550

544. See Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 6000–VCP, 2011 WL 941464,
at *10 (Del. Ch. 2011).
545. See Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988) (refusing to enforce an agreement precluding a school board from disclosing a
teacher’s history of pedophilia to other school districts); Terry Morehead Dworkin &
Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the Media: When is a “Source” a
“Sourcerer”?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 387 (1992) (observing that “[a]ll
sources of trade secret law observe certain limitations, explicitly or implicitly
excluding from protection information concerning wrongdoing”).
546. See Bowman, 542 N.E.2d at 667 (refusing to enforce an agreement
precluding a school board from disclosing a teacher’s history of pedophilia to other
school districts).
547. See Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732, 737 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 2002) (holding that there is significant public interest in a discriminationfree workplace) (citing Dixon v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., 541 A.2d 1046, 1063
(1988) (O’Hern, J., concurring)).
548. See infra Section IV.C.IV (arguing that courts should be wary of
employer attempts to conceal sexual harassment).
549. See, e.g., Bowman, 542 N.E.2d at 737.
550. Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 415 (D.D.C. 1994).
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In addition to the general public interest against concealing
illegal activity, the investing public has a specific interest in knowing
what types of liability risks companies are exposed to in this domain.551
In fact, investors have begun demanding clauses in merger agreements
representing that executives and managers of the target firm have not
been accused of sexual harassment, suggesting a strong investor
interest in disclosure of harassment.552
Not only is sexual harassment legally prohibited, but it also
poses risks to public health and safety.553 Health and safety are
arguably paramount in the hierarchy of public interests recognized by
courts.554 But traditionally, sexual harassment has not been viewed as
a public health and safety issue. Rather, it has been viewed as a private
harm to an individual who may contract for compensation and silence
based on his or her own personal interests.555 #MeToo has revealed
sexual harassment to be a broader public, social, and economic harm
by documenting the sheer pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the
workplace and by providing compelling personal narratives
illustrating the serious harms it causes. #MeToo vividly reinforced
what social science research long has documented: that large numbers
of individuals experience sexual harassment at work and that the
perpetrators are often serial harassers whose behavior is not isolated
to one individual.556 The numbers matter for understanding sexual
551. See, e.g., EMPOWER Act, H.R. 3728, 115th Cong. (2018) (requiring
public companies to report the number of sexual harassment cases they settled and the
presence of employees with repeated settlements in their annual SEC filings);
Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 6000–VCP, 2011 WL 941464, at *10 (Del. Ch.
2011) (finding that disclosure of a letter detailing sexual harassment allegations
against the Hewlett-Packard CEO would “be valuable to a society concerned with
corporate governance and integrity”).
552. See Nabila Ahmed, Wall Street is Adding a New ‘Weinstein Clause’
Before Making Deals, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 1, 2018, 11:29 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-01/-weinstein-clause-creepsinto-deals-as-wary-buyers-seek-cover [https://perma.cc/3QPD-UKT6] (discussing
that these guarantees have come to be known as “#MeToo rep[s]” or “Weinstein
clause[s]”).
553. See Spector, supra note 529.
554. See Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality
Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 672 (1999); see also Short,
supra note 512, at 1212.
555. See MACKINNON, supra note 21.
556. See CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON
THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 6 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EUM5-P5KL]
(finding that in a survey of U.S. workers, 25% said that they had experienced sexual
harassment in the workplace, 40% reported experiencing one or more behaviors that
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harassment as a social rather than an individual problem. As one court
opined in allowing discovery about prior sexual harassment despite an
NDA, the public’s “concern [about sexual harassment] grows more
pressing as additional individuals are harmed by identical or similar
action.”557 The weight of this interest has also been suggested by recent
commentary recommending that sexual harassment NDAs should be
kept “in an information escrow that would be released for
investigation by the EEOC . . . and other investigative authorities if
another complaint is received against the same perpetrator.”558
In addition, #MeToo stories have made salient the serious harms
to health and safety caused by sexual harassment, which have been
extensively documented in social science research. Researchers have
shown that individuals who experience sexual harassment are at
greater risk for a number of health problems, including: increased
stress,559 depression,560 PTSD,561 and lower reported psychological
wellbeing.562 These problems can last well beyond the time when the

would constitute sexual harassment, and 60% experienced insults based on their
gender); Remus Ilies et al., Reported Incidence Rates of Work-Related Sexual
Harassment in the United States: Using Meta-Analysis to Explain Reported Rate
Disparities, 56 PERS. PSYCHOL. 607, 607 (2006) (conducting meta-analysis of fiftyfive studies of over 86,000 respondents find that 58% of women experienced
harassing behaviors in the workplace); Paula McDonald, Workplace Sexual
Harassment 30 Years on: A Review of the Literature 14 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 1 (2012)
(estimating based on an overview of then-existing research that between 40–75% of
women and 12–31% of men experience workplace sexual harassment).
557. Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 366 (D. Nev. 1993).
558. Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. 76, 76
(2018).
559. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534; Pina & Gannon, supra note 534.
560. See Jason N. Houle et al., The Impact of Sexual Harassment on
Depressive Symptoms During the Early Occupational Career, 1 SOC’Y & MENTAL
HEALTH 89, 89 (2011) (finding significantly higher levels of depression in harassed
vs. non-harassed workers controlling for factors like work-related stressors,
education, and history of depression); Pina & Gannon, supra note 534; Amy E. Street
et al., Gender Differences in Experiences of Sexual Harassment: Data From a MaleDominated Environment, 75 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 464, 464 (2007).
561. See Pina & Gannon, supra note 534; Street, supra note 560.
562. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 648-49; M. Sandy Hershcovis
& Julian Barling, Comparing Victim Attributions & Outcomes for Workplace
Aggression & Sexual Harassment, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 874, 875 (2010); Liberty
J. Munson, Andrew G. Miner & Charles Hulin, Labeling Sexual Harassment in the
Military: An Extension and Replication, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 293, 296 (2001);
Morten Birkeland Nielsen et al., Sexual Harassment: Prevalence, Outcomes, and
Gender Differences Assessed by Three Different Estimation Methods, 19 J.
Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 252, 253 (2010); Pina & Gannon, supra note
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harassment occurred,563 and they often manifest as physical symptoms,
including pain, nausea, and sleep disorders.564 These harms are not
only personally devastating to survivors but they also may require
costly medical treatment, can negatively impact the survivor’s broader
circle of family and co-workers, and have measurable negative
impacts on the broader economy.565 Workers who have experienced
harassment are less productive,566 have lower levels of organizational
commitment567 and job satisfaction,568 and have increased turnover
rates.569 Studies have also shown that sexual harassment has negative
consequences for bystander witnesses to harassment, who report
negative job, health, and psychological outcomes that mirror those
experienced by harassment targets.570
While the harms of sexual harassment are substantial, they are
not always immediately recognized and often remain latent and
unaddressed for some period of time, exacerbating the associated
health risks.571 Studies have documented that many victims of
behaviors that fit the legal definition of sexual harassment do not
identify their experiences as harassment.572 However, it has been
534, at 221 (finding that harassment survivors are at greater risk of experiencing
anger, fear, sadness, humiliation, and mistrust); Street, supra note 560, at 465.
563. See generally Houle et al., supra note 560 (finding that early career
sexual harassment has long-term effects on depressive symptoms later in life).
564. See Pina & Gannon, supra note 534, at 221; Spector, supra note 531.
Anecdotally, it has been reported that harassed “[e]mployees talk of having a pit in
their stomach commuting to work, having anxiety, panic attacks, inexplicable fits of
crying and physical manifestations of stress: hair falling out, hives, weight gain or
loss, sleeplessness and lethargy.” Id.
565. See infra notes 566-569.
566. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 649; Pina & Gannon, supra note
534, at 220.
567. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 649; Munson, Minor, & Hulin,
supra note 562, at 296; Pina & Gannon, supra note 534, at 220 (finding that less
attachment to the employer organization leads to costly work withdrawal behaviors,
including being late, neglectful, and avoiding work tasks).
568. See Hershcovis & Barling, supra note 562, at 874; Nielsen et al., supra
note 562, at 254; Pina & Gannon, supra note 534, at 220.
569. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 649; Hershcovis & Barling,
supra note 562, at 886; Pina & Gannon, supra note 534, at 220.
570. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 650; Pina & Gannon, supra note
534, at 221.
571. See infra notes 572-575.
572. See Ilies et al., supra note 556, at 623-24 (finding that less than half of
women who reported experiencing harassing behaviors labeled their experience as
harassment); Heather McLaughlin, Christopher Uggen & Amy Blackstone, The
Economic and Career Effects of Sexual Harassment on Working Women, 31 GENDER
& SOC’Y 333, 345 (2017) (finding that less than one third of both men and women
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shown that discussion about incidents of harassment with co-workers,
friends, and family can help individuals recognize their own
experiences as harassment and seek help.573 Critically, failing to
recognize sexual harassment does not insulate victims from the harms
associated with it.574 Those harms have been found to affect
individuals even if they do not label the harassing behavior they
experienced as “sexual harassment.”575 This latent quality exacerbates
the potential harms of harassment and heightens the public interest in
open and honest dialogue about it.
In addition to social science research documenting the
pervasiveness and the harm of sexual harassment, various state and
federal statutes provide evidence of the growing consensus that there
is a strong public interest in disclosing sexual harassment.576 Section
178 of the Second Restatement of Contracts indicates that in deciding
whether a contract violates public policy, courts should consider,
among other factors, “the strength of [the] policy as manifested by
legislation or judicial decisions.”577 While courts do not need statutory
authority to invoke the public policy exception to NDA enforceability
and may rely solely on adverse third-parties impacts, statutory labor
law, open records laws, whistleblower protection laws, and the
cascade of legislative activity in the wake of #MeToo provide
persuasive evidence of the public interest in bringing harassment to
light.578
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has long been held
to forbid employers’ use of NDAs to prevent employees from
discussing workplace sexual harassment with one another on the
grounds that this would violate the act’s protections of employees’
right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or
who experienced harassing behaviors labeled their experience as harassment);
Munson, Minor & Hulin, supra note 562, at 294.
573. See McLaughlin, Uggen & Blackstone, supra note 572, at 337.
574. See Munson, Minor, & Hulin, supra note 562, at 300-01.
575. Id. at 293, 300-01.
576. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 1, § 178 (AM.
LAW INST. 1981).
577. Id.
578. See Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 663 (Ohio Ct. App.)
(refusing to enforce an agreement precluding a school board from disclosing a
teacher’s history of pedophilia to other school districts despite lack of clear statutory
authority to do so); Ryan M. Philp, Silence at Our Expense: Balancing Safety and
Secrecy in Non-Disclosure Agreements, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 845, 860, 876 (2003)
(arguing that legislation is not definitive but can serve “as a judicial guidepost”);
Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1956-60 (1996).
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protection.579 State open records statutes have provided grounds for
some state courts to invalidate NDAs shielding sexual harassment
claims settled by government entities.580 Most states have enacted
statutes affording whistleblowers protection “to expose, deter, and
curtail wrongdoing.”581 These could support non-enforcement of
NDAs used to conceal employer wrongdoing.
Finally, in the wake of #MeToo, there has been a wave of
legislative activity explicitly addressing sexual harassment NDAs.582
New York and Washington have enacted legislation limiting the use
of NDAs to conceal harassment or other types of sexual assault.583
579. See Phoenix Transit Sys. & Amalgamated Transit Union, Case 28-CA15177, 337 NLRB No. 78 (N.L.R.B 2002) (ordering employer to cease and desist
from “[m]aintaining or enforcing a rule which prohibits employees from discussing
among themselves their sexual harassment complaints” based on their rights under
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection).
580. See Pierce v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 944 P.2d 646, 649-51 (Colo.
App. 1997) (concluding based on the existence of state open records laws that the
provisions of a settlement agreement “prohibiting discussion or disclosure of the
circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s resignation and prohibiting disparaging
comments or remarks are void as a violation of public policy”; overturned on the
grounds there was no statutory directive guiding that decision); Asbury Park Press v.
Cty. of Monmouth, 966 A.2d 75, 75, 79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (reversing
the trial court and ordering the County to disclose documentation of a sexual
harassment settlement with one of its employees to journalists despite a confidentiality
agreement: “The trial court found it significant that [the harassment victim] and the
County included terms of confidentiality in their settlement agreement. But the
parties’ agreement cannot override the public’s right of access under OPRA.”).
581. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000) (discussing that in 2000,
all fifty states had whistleblower protection statutes; in 2010, some states had removed
these statutes); 2012 Whistleblowing Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/2012-whistleblower-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/QW4B-TEXB].
582. See, e.g., S.B. S6382A (N.Y. 2018); S.B. 5996 (Wash. 2018); CAL. CODE
OF CIV. P. § 1002 (2017).
583. See S.B. S6382A (N.Y. 2018) (prohibits nondisclosure clauses in any
settlement, agreement or other resolution of a claim or cause of action, the factual
foundation for which involves sexual harassment unless the agreement expressly
states that it is the complainant’s preference to include such a confidentiality
provision); S.B. 5996 (Wash. 2018) (prohibits employers from requiring employees
to sign, as a condition of employment, a NDA preventing them from “disclosing or
discussing sexual harassment or sexual assault occurring in the workplace, at workrelated events coordinated by or through the employer, or between employees, or
between an employer and an employee, off the employment premises” and provides
that such agreements—including nondisclosure agreements that predate the new
law—will be void and unenforceable); see also CAL. CODE OF CIV. P. § 1002 (2017)
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Similar legislation has been introduced in Kansas, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania.584 A bipartisan group of U.S. senators introduced the
EMPOWER Act, which would prohibit NDAs covering sexual
harassment as “a condition of employment, promotion, compensation,
benefits or change in employment status”585 and render such existing
NDAs unenforceable.586 This groundswell of legislative activity,
viewed against the backdrop of state statutes providing more
generalized protections for employees and whistleblowers, provides
strong evidence of a public interest in disclosure.
That said, there are public interests in secrecy that should be
considered as well. Many survivors of harassment prefer
confidentiality to public disclosure.587 As one member of the
employment defense bar put it, “With the possible exception of Gloria
Allred, almost nobody wants attention to be drawn to a sexual
harassment case”—including survivors.588 This means that there is a
public interest in maintaining the option for survivors to negotiate for
enforceable confidentiality provisions in agreements settling
harassment claims. Some have argued that finding sexual harassment
NDAs unenforceable would make them unavailable to the many
survivors who want them because employers and accused harassers
would either refuse to settle harassment claims or would not be willing
to pay significant compensation to a survivor to settle claims that
could later be made public with impunity.589 These are serious
concerns. However, it is not clear that abrogating NDAs to permit
public disclosures by the small handful of survivors who decide to go
public after signing an NDA would radically alter settlement practices
by employers and employees in run-of-the-mill cases. As discussed
above, such disclosures are already permitted in court, to regulatory
(prohibiting non-disclosure provisions in cases involving a felony sex offense,
childhood sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of a minor, and sexual assault).
584. H.B. 2695 (Kan. 2018) (prohibiting state funds distribution to pay sexual
harassment claims and prohibiting non-disclosure agreements for sexual harassment
settlements in “certain circumstances”); S.B. No. 121 (N.J. 2018) (barring agreements
that conceal details of discrimination claims); S.B. No. 999 (Pa. 2018) (prohibiting
NDAs within contracts or secret out-of-court settlements related to sexual harassment
or misconduct).
585. EMPOWER Act, S. 2994 (a)(1) 115TH Cong. (2018).
586. See EMPOWER Act, § (a)(2).
587. See Robin Shea, In Defense of Confidentiality (Yes, Even In Harassment
Cases), CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE LLP (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.constangy.com/employment-labor-insider/ban-confidentiality-in-sexharassment-settlements-youll [https://perma.cc/9RKF-WZ4R].
588. Id.
589. See id.
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agencies, and to fellow employees.590 Nonetheless, there is no
evidence that these broad exceptions have inhibited employers’ use of
sexual harassment NDAs.591 The continued availability of NDAs to
those survivors who want them is an empirical question that can only
be answered in time as law and practices evolve in response to
changing norms. The ability of survivors to negotiate meaningfully for
confidentiality is an interest that courts should consider as these cases
come before them.
D. The “Reasonableness” Standard as a Reasonable Way Forward
As indicated above, rather than wait for common law standards
governing sexual harassment NDAs to develop, some states are
proceeding with legislation to enact categorical rules that presumably
reflect the legislature’s view of the appropriate balance of employer,
employee, and public interests. For instance, New York’s recently
enacted statute prohibits nondisclosure clauses in any settlement,
agreement, or other resolution of a claim or cause of action, “the
factual foundation for which involves sexual harassment,” unless the
agreement expressly states that it is the “complainant’s preference” to
include such a confidentiality provision.592 Washington state’s
proposed legislation prohibits employers from requiring employees to
sign sexual harassment NDAs as a condition of employment, but it
allows employers and employees to negotiate confidentiality
provisions as a part of settlement agreements.593
Even if such statutes embody sound policy, they do not diminish
the importance of the common law’s case-by-case approach to
reasonableness assessments. First, most states have not enacted
statutes addressing sexual harassment NDAs. The common law is the
only avenue for addressing them in these jurisdictions. Second, even
in states with statutes governing sexual harassment NDAs, questions
are likely to arise over whether agreements reached in compliance
with the statute are nonetheless unreasonable. For instance,
Washington’s statute permits NDAs reached as part of settlement
agreements, and these might be unreasonable under common law
590. See supra Subsections IV.B.-C.
591. See Ayres, supra note 558, at 85 (suggesting that employers continue to
draft NDAs that prohibit lawful disclosures and arguing that sexual harassment NDAs
should only be enforceable if they explicitly disclose the rights that survivors retain
to report the perpetrator’s behavior to the EEOC and other investigative authorities).
592. S.B. S6382A (N.Y. 2018).
593. See S. 5996, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018).
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standards in some circumstances.594 Similarly, some have argued that
New York’s requirement that an NDA be the “complainant’s
preference” swallows the statute’s prohibition on NDAs because
employers will refuse to settle claims without including a boilerplate
“complainant’s preference” clause.595 Nominally compliant NDAs in
which signers are forced to assert an affirmative preference for
confidentiality might well be unreasonable under common law
standards.596 Finally, this is an area where norms, standards, and
practices are evolving rapidly; the social ground is shifting beneath
our collective feet. The appeal of the “reasonableness” analysis
described in this section is that it allows for a different balance to be
struck under different factual circumstances and for enforceability
standards to evolve with norms and practices.
CONCLUSION
Polling data suggests that judges may soon face an avalanche of
opportunities to reflect on the impact of the norm cascade on the law:
38% of Americans in a recent Gallup poll said that recent events have
made them more likely to sue.597 Plaintiffs’ employment lawyers and
human resources professionals report being deluged with sexual
harassment complaints.598 An NBC–Wall Street Journal poll found
that 78% of women are now more likely to speak out if they feel they
are being treated unfairly due to their gender, and 77% of men say they
594. See Wash. S.B. 5996 (2018).
595. John L. Valentino, Will N.Y. Law Banning Non-Disclosure Agreements
Eliminate Their Use?, BOUSQUET HOLSTEIN, PLLC (Aug. 16, 2018),
http://bhlawpllc.com/publication/will-n-y-law-banning-non-disclosure-agreementseliminate-their-use/ [https://perma.cc/2N47-S463].
596. See generally id. Indeed, it is particularly important for courts to police
the reasonableness of such NDAs, as employers are likely to point to “complainant’s
preference” clauses as evidence that an agreement is presumptively valid even if they
do not meaningfully reflect the complainant’s preferences. Id.
597. Saad, supra note 63.
598. See Amelia Gentleman & Joanna Walters, #MeToo is Raising Awareness,
But Taking Sexual Abuse to Court is a Minefield, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017, 7:06 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/metoo-is-raising-awareness-buttaking-sexual-abuse-to-court-is-a-minefield [https://perma.cc/AV24-C22Y]; see also
Yuki Noguchi, #MeToo Complaints Swamp Human Resources Departments, NPR
(June 4, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/04/615783454/-metoocomplaints-swamp-human-resource-departments
[https://perma.cc/CBS6-45QY];
Maya Rhodan, #MeToo Has ‘Tripled’ Web Traffic for the Federal Agency That
Investigates Harassment, TIME (June 12, 2018), http://time.com/5308836/sexualharassment-metoo-eeoc-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/CHE4-UBGD].
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are more likely to speak out now if they see a woman being unfairly
treated for the same reason.599 Perhaps more radically, women who
experience sexual harassment are now much more likely to recognize
it as such.600
This dramatic change in norms around sexual harassment has
occurred in a very short period of time. Courts must take these new
norms into account in deciding sexual harassment cases today. These
new norms define what it means to be a “reasonable jury” or a
599. Carrie Dann, NBC/WSJ Poll: Nearly Half of Working Women Say
They’ve Experienced Harassment, NBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017, 7:00 AM)
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/nbc-wsj-poll-nearly-half-workingwomen-say-they-ve-n815376 [https://perma.cc/4USY-6PCG].
600. See, e.g., CHAI FELDBLUM & VICTORIA LIPNIC, REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS
OF THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 8-10
(2016) (describing shifts in public perception regarding sexual harassment).
Historically, polling questions that asked if respondents had experienced specific
behaviors (behavioral questions) found sharply higher levels of sexual harassment
than did polling questions that asked simply whether the respondent had experienced
sexual harassment (direct inquiries). See, e.g., Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at
642-43. Today, that gap has largely closed, with roughly 60% of women now
reporting sexual harassment in direct-inquiry polling. FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note
600, at 9. By comparing rates of harassment measured through direct-inquiry and
behavioral questions, research has repeatedly shown that only half of all women who
have been sexually harassed identify their experiences as “sexual harassment.” See
Iles et al., supra note 556, at 607. One meta-analysis of fifty-five studies including
over 86,000 respondents found that 58% of women had experienced behaviors that
qualified as harassment, but less than half of these women were willing to label them
as such. Id. This trend is particularly well exemplified in an extensive report released
by an EEOC task force in June 2016. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 600, at 810. According to the report, when asked directly (in surveys) if they had experienced
sexual harassment, only 25% of women said yes. Id. When respondents were given a
list of behaviors considered harassing by researchers and asked what they had
personally experienced within a given time frame, the rate of harassment rose to 40%.
Id. at 8-9. When including questions related to gender harassment (i.e. sex-based put
downs rather than come-ons) the rate rose to 60% of women. Id. at 9. According to
polls conducted post the explosion of the #MeToo movement, now between 42–60%
of women report being sexually harassed when asked directly, a dramatic shift from
only 25% in 2016. See, e.g., 60% of U.S. Women Say They’ve Been Sexually Harassed
Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Trump Job Approval Still Stuck Below
40%,
QUINNIPIAC
UNIV.
(2017),
https://poll.qu.edu/national/releasedetail?ReleaseID=2502 [https://perma.cc/9JVJ-96WN]. Given that the rate of
workplace sexual harassment has remained relatively stable over time, the dramatic
increase in the number of women who say they have been sexually harassed is most
likely due to a shift in perception; the #MeToo movement has changed the way
women view their workplace interactions and has led many to newly label what they
have long experienced as “sexual harassment.” See Iles et al., supra note 556, at 625
(finding generally that rates of workplace sexual harassment have remained constant
over time).
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“reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” They define what
information an employer may “reasonably” ask an employee to
conceal about sexual harassment. In short, they define what’s
“reasonable” now.
Our request is modest: Let juries play their proper role in
applying the “reasonableness” standards. These standards are
designed to allow juries “to make commonsense determinations about
human behavior, reasonableness, and state of mind based on objective
standards.”601 They are meant to ensure that sexual harassment law is
informed by community standards of appropriate behavior in the
workplace.602 Federal judges should allow juries to do the difficult
work of grappling with facts and establishing norms about what
conduct is considered appropriate in the age of #MeToo. If the polls
are any indication, most of us already know.

601. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 NYU L. REV. 982, 1134 (2003).
602. See Beiner 1999, supra note 126, at 82.

